The Brain In Context

By Sarah W. Denton

Sarah W. Denton is a research assistant with the Science and Technology Innovation Program at the Wilson Center. Denton is also a research assistant with the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at George Mason University. Her research primarily focuses on ethical and governance implications for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, neurotechnology, gene-editing technology, and pharmaceuticals. 

Tim Brown, University of Washington PhD student and research assistant with the Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering’s (CSNE) Neuroethics Thrust, introduced the session titled, “The Brain in Context,” at the International Neuroethics Society’s 2017 Annual Meeting moderated by Husseini Manji, Janssen Global Therapeutic Neuroscience Area Head. This session provided a multidisciplinary view of the challenges we face today in understanding the context of lived experiences and how our brains impact our environments. Getting at the heart of the context in which our brains develop and grow may help us to reduce stigma by increasing our understanding of how our environments impact our brains in a myriad of ways.

Socioeconomic Status and the Brain

Martha Farah, Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society at the University of Pennsylvania, kicked off the panel discussion by speaking about her recent research on the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and the brain. The factors affecting the brain not only arise from our physical bodies, but also include our social environments [1]. Specifically, Farah has focused her attention on socioeconomic status and how it affects everything, from life expectancy to education to income – all of which are inherently connected to the context and the environments in which our brains develop.

The way the brain develops is a causal pathway to a variety of outcomes. For instance, there is a surprisingly strong relationship between cognitive ability, as measured by IQ and school achievement, and SES [2]. Farah’s lab performed three studies that aimed to characterize SES disparities in terms of cognitive neuroscience’s model of mind, rather than through intelligence and standardized test scores [3,4,5]. Cognitive neuroscientists employ the ‘information processing’ view of the mind, which is a fundamental construct of cognitive psychology that “refers to the rule-governed transformation of [both unconscious and conscious] metal representations” (e.g., explicit perception, implicit learning, implicit memory [6]. This view of the mind appeals to computational methods in both cognitive psychology and neuroscience to understand the molecular mechanisms implicated in information processing [7].

Developed from a slide shown during Farah’s panel 

discussion titled, “Socioeconomic Status and the Brain,” 

at the 2017 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting 

on November 10, 2017 at the American Academy for the 

Advancement of Science (AAAS) building in Washington, D.C.

Farah’s findings suggest that the most pronounced socioeconomic-derived disparities were both executive function associated with the prefrontal cortex and declarative memory associated with the hippocampus. We know that the brain is usually discussed in a descriptive and mechanistic way, but this conception may be unhelpful. Although there are currently no unique implications, research moving towards a more illustrative and actionable understanding of the brain in context is adding to the weight of evidence that our environment, including SES, has profound affects on our brains. Thus, neuroethics and neuroscience policy is relevant precisely because it increases the weight of evidence. The end goal of Farah’s research program is to understand poverty using insight from neuroscience in order to help “break the cycle” and guide future policy decisions. 

Prenatal Programming of Human Fetal Brain Development 

The second panelist, Moriah Thomason, Director of the Perinatal Neural Connectivity Unit of the Perinatology Research Branch with the Detroit Medical Center and Wayne State University School of Medicine, built upon this discussion and defined the first context of our brain – the womb. Her research centers around prenatal programming of human fetal brain development and has found that alterations in brain development in utero have significant cognitive effects.

Earlier this year, Thomason published a study in Scientific Reports that suggested differences in how certain brain regions communicate with each other in fetuses that were later born prematurely when compared to fetuses that were carried to term [8].

Thomason’s research team used fMRI to determine which brain regions were involved in synchronized activity between brain regions, which suggests that these regions are well connected and share information [9]. The brain in utero is essentially in a state of becoming and sets the stage for our future abilities even before we take our first breaths outside of the womb. For instance, a mother experiencing high levels of stress seems to imprint this stress on the fetal brain [10]. This fetal programming affects the functional connectivity in the fetal brain prior to birth. Her “Prenatal Imaging of Neural Connectivity (PINC)” study has found that the prenatal stress score (depression, perceived stress, satisfaction with life, and anxiety) is correlated to fetal brain connectivity in several notable brain areas, including three subregions of the cerebellum.

Image courtesy of Pexels.

One implication of Thomason’s research is that we no longer need to limit the brain to a postnatal context– neural connectivity begins prior to birth. This suggests that prenatal brain development is intimately tied to the mother’s environment and psycho-physio state, which may have a wide range of implications that have yet to be explored. This is just the beginning for Thomason and prenatal neuro-connectivity research, and I am eager to see neuroethicists explore the implications of the brain in the context of the womb.

Do Brains Matter Using Screens?

The final panelist, Hervé Chneiweiss, Research Director at École des Neurosciences Paris Île-de-France, moved us from the brain in the context of the womb to the brain in the context of our increasing use of technology – particularly screens like those found in our phones, televisions, and tablets. The social context is perhaps the most important while we learn; yet, our increasing reliance on screens as an educational tool may hinder our ability to learn how to interact with others in our physical environments [See 11,12,13].

In this context, neuro-education has evolved from two-dimensional to five-dimensional; but now we are moving back to 2D screens. Moreover, there is a correlation between excessive screen time and the development of psychiatric disorders, lack of sleep, and impaired cognition [14]. Beyond the potential cognitive effects of excessive screen-time, Chneiweiss is also concerned about the marketing of attention, i.e., the subjection to excessive screen time in the workplace and nonmaleficence in advertising the educational benefits of brain training apps.

On the latter, Chneiweiss is particularly concerned about the vague educational benefit claims made by many apps directed at vulnerable populations like children and seniors [15]. The democratization of screens has created two new kinds of pathology: nomophobia, phobia of being without a phone; and fomo, the fear of missing out, fear of being disconnected of the social network. While these characterizations are a bit tongue-in-cheek, they highlight real problems that can significantly affect our cognitive abilities.

Image courtesy of Pixabay.

As a general rule of thumb, owning a console or tablet presents more risks than benefits, such as insomnia and social-skill development, for children under the age of six [16]. But, by the time they reach their teenage years, certain action-oriented games can indeed improve cognitive abilities such as visual attention and decision-making [17]. To address this discrepancy, we must educate children and their parents on how their brains work and how screens affect their brain functions.

Conclusion



All three panelists presented neuroscience research in the social context. Martha Farah’s presentation showed how social and other environmental factors, like income, can have significant effects on brain development. Moriah Thomason’s presentation of her research went even farther – connecting stress levels of mothers to prenatal brain development. Finally, Hervé Chneiweiss spoke on how the use of screens, like those found in television sets and iPhones, can not only affect child and adolescent brain development but can also affect how they interact in the social environments around them.
The primary takeaway from this session is that our brains do not develop in a neuropsychiatric vacuum– our social and cultural environments can have significant implications for neuroscience. In the Q&A after the presentations, I found it of particular interest that each panelist agreed that the social context is the most important context when it comes to understanding the brain and conducting neuroscientific research.

Now, as we move forward, we should approach neuroscience research and its findings in the context of our social environments if we are to create a more holistic understanding of the brain.

References

[1] M. Farah. 2012. “Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of Neuroscience,” The Annual Review of Psychology: University of Pennsylvania, 63: pp. 571-91 [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/farah-Neuroethics-The-Ethical-Legal-and-Societal-Impact-of-Neuroscience.pdf ]; B. Avants, et al. 2012. “Early childhood environment predicts frontal and temporal cortical thickness in the young adult brain,” presentation at The Society for Neuroscience 2012 Meeting, abstract can be found here: [http://www.abstractsonline.com/Plan/ViewAbstract.aspx?sKey=734b1ccd-cfcf-4394-a945-083ca58f8033&cKey=7b3e8587-f590-4d94-ae3f-e050d52e8488&mKey=%7b70007181-01C9-4DE9-A0A2-EEBFA14CD9F1%7d]; M. Mariani. 2017. “The neuroscience of inequality: does poverty show up in children’s brains?” The Guardian, (13 July) [https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/jul/13/neuroscience-inequality-does-poverty-show-up-in-childrens-brains].

[2] Martha Farah, Socioeconomic Status and Brain. University of Pennsylvania, Center for Neuroscience & Society. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/martha-j-farah-phd/research/socioeconomic-status-and-brain/].

[3] K. Nobel, M.F. Norman, and M. Farah. 2005. “Neurocognitive correlates of socioeconomic status in kindergarten children,” Developmental Science, 8(1): pp. 74-87. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Development-kindergarten.pdf].

[4] M. Farah, et. al. 2006. “Childhood poverty: Specific associations with neurocognitive development,” Brain Research, 1110: pp. 166-174. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Development-povertyassociation.pdf ].

[5] K. Noble, B. McCandliss, and M. Farah. 2007. “Socioeconomic gradients predict individual differences in neurocognitive abilities,” Developmental Science, 10(4): pp. 464-480. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Development-gradiants.pdf]

[6] D. David, M. Miclea, and A. Opre 2004. “The Information-Processing Approach to the Human Mind: Basics and Beyond,” Journal of Clinical Psychology, 60(4): pp. 355,357. [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15022267].

[7] "The Philosophy of Neuroscience" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Chapter 6: A Result of the Co-Evolutionary Research Ideology - Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience. 2010. [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neuroscience/#ResCoEvoResIdeCogComNeu].

[8] M. Thomason et. al. 2017. “Weak functional connectivity in the human fetal brain prior to preterm birth,” Scientific Reports, 7(39286). [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5221666/]. Of course, these findings are preliminary, but Thomason is enthusiastic and plans to continue this research with larger sample sizes.

[9] G. Miller. 2017. “Pioneering study images in fetal brains,” Science Magazine, (9 January). [http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/pioneering-study-images-activity-fetal-brains].

[10] M. Thomason et. al. 2017. “Weak functional connectivity in the human fetal brain prior to preterm birth,” Scientific Reports, 7(39286). [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5221666/].

[11] J.E. Brody. 2015. “Screen Addiction is Taking a Toll on Children,” The New York Times (6 July) [https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/06/screen-addiction-is-taking-a-toll-on-children/]

[12] USC Center for Work and Family Life, “Sleep Deprivation in the Age of Electronics,” [http://cwfl.usc.edu/wellness/sleephandouts/Sleep_Deprivation_in_the_Age_of_Electronics-CWFL.pdf]

[13] G.S. Goldfield, et al., “Screen time is associated with depressive symptomatology among obese adolescents: a HEARTY study,” European Journal of Pediatrics, v. 175(7): pp. 909-919 (July) [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00431-016-2720-z].

[14] P. Reany. 2011. “Not Getting Enough Sleep? Turn off the Technology,” Reuters (7 March) [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sleep-technology/not-getting-enough-sleep-turn-off-the-technology-idUSTRE7260RH20110307].

[15] R. Robbins. 2016. “U.S. Cracking Down on ‘Brain Training’ Games,” Scientific American, STAT (6 September) [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-cracking-down-on-brain-training-games/]; E. Yong. 2016. “The Weak Evidence Behind Brain-Training Games,” The Atlantic (3 October) [https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/the-weak-evidence-behind-brain-training-games/502559/].

[16] K. Subrahmanyam, et al. 2000. “The Impact of Home Computer Use on Children’s Activities and Development,” The Future of Children, (Fall/Winter): Princeton University [https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/10_02_05.pdf].

[17] I. Granic, et al. 2014. “The Benefits of Playing Video Games,” American Psychologist, (January) [https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-a0034857.pdf]; D. Bavelier, et al. 2011. “Brains on video games,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 12: pp. 763-768 (18 November) [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4633025/]. 

Want to cite this post?




Denton, S. (2018). The Brain In Context. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2018/03/the-brain-in-context.html

Intelligence Testing: Accurate or Extremely Biased?

By Emily Young



In the early 1900s, psychologist Charles Spearman noticed that children who did well in one subject in school were likely to do well in other subjects as well, and those who did poorly in one subject were likely to do poorly across all subjects. He concluded that there is a factor, g, which correlates with testing performance (Spearman 1904). The g factor is defined as the measure of the variance of testing performance between individuals and is sometimes called “general intelligence”.



Later on, psychologist Raymond Cattell determined that there are two subsets of g, called fluid intelligence (denoted Gf) and crystallized intelligence (denoted Gc). Fluid intelligence is defined as abstract reasoning or logic; it is an individual’s ability to solve a novel problem or puzzle. Crystalized intelligence is more knowledge based, and is defined as the ability to use one’s learned skills, knowledge, and experience (Cattell 1987). It is important to note that while crystallized intelligence relies on knowledge, it is not a measure of knowledge but rather a measure of the ability to use one’s knowledge.



The first standardized intelligence test was created in 1905 by French Psychologist Albert Binet, as a method to screen for mental retardation in French schoolboys. The test measured intelligence by comparing an individual’s score to the average score of children his own age (Binet 1905). The test was later revised by Lewis Terman of Stanford University and named the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales. The Stanford-Binet is now in its fifth edition and includes five sections: fluid reasoning, knowledge, quantitative reasoning, visual-spatial processing, and working memory.



Since the Stanford-Binet, many other standardized intelligence scales have been developed. One of the most popular modern intelligence tests is the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) test (Raven, 2003). The test gives individuals a series of boxes, each containing shapes that change from box to box, and a box that is empty. The test taker must recognize the pattern that is shown and correctly identify the shape that should go in the empty box from a collection of options. Unlike the Stanford-Binet, RPM is entirely visual; the test taker does not have to answer written questions, meaning the measured IQ is not dependent on reading comprehension. This allows for better testing that eliminates variables such as native language, age, and possible reading disability.

A general example of the questions on the Raven’s Progessive Matrices test.

So what exactly are these IQ tests measuring? The Stanford-Binet measures g through tasks that measure both Gf and Gc. Because RPM is entirely non-verbal and puzzle based, it almost exclusively measures Gf.



Which brings us to the next question; are these tests effectively measuring g?



Since their creation, modern Western intelligence testing has shown a difference in average intelligence, varying from group to group; whites score higher than blacks, the rich score higher than the poor. In some tests, women and men score differently from task to task. Are these differences due to heritable differences in intelligence between race, gender, and socioeconomic status? Or are environment, schooling, and stigma to blame? Or, are the tests themselves flawed?



While intelligence tests claim to be culture-fair, none of the tests created so far are one hundred percent unbiased. As Serpell (1979) found, when asked to reproduce figures from using wire, pencil and paper, and clay, Zambian children performed better in the wire task, while English children performed better in the pencil and paper task. Each group did better in the medium to which they were more accustomed. Pencil and paper IQ tests may be intrinsically biased towards Western culture.



Furthermore, while African-Americans have historically scored lower than white Americans on intelligence testing, this gap as been lessening in recent years (Dickens and Flynn 2006). This could be the result of one of two things; the first possibility is that average intelligence is increasing in the black community at a higher rate than in the white community (measured intelligence has been steadily increasing across all groups due to the Flynn effect). However, it seems more likely that post-segregation, white and black cultures have been merging, and schools have been integrated, meaning that white and black children have a better chance of receiving the same education. If this is the case, IQ tests are either measuring knowledge more than the test creators think they do, or the tests are extremely culturally biased, but this bias is lessening due to assimilation of white and black culture in America.



Not only are intelligence tests culturally biased, but they also seem to be biased in favor of neurotypical individuals. For example, while typically developing individuals generally perform similarly on RPM and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), individuals with Autism typically score higher on RPM than on WAIS (Bolte et al. 2009, Mottron 2004). This is because while RPM is a visual task, WAIS is almost entirely verbal. Individuals with autism seem to use visual strategies to solve tasks and therefore have difficulty on tasks that can only be solved verbally (Kunda and Goel 2010). While this phenomenon is typically seen as a cognitive deficit, it is important to note that autistic individuals outperform neurotypical individuals on some visual tasks.



Therefore, by only measuring one specific part of intelligence, some IQ tests portray autistic individuals as having a cognitive deficit. What if some disorders, such as autism, are not actually disorders, but simply a way of thinking that differs from what is considered “normal”?



For example, Dr. Temple Grandin, an autistic woman with a PhD in Animal Sciences, uses her incredible visual working memory to design cattle equipment that is much more humane and far less anxiety-inducing than previous models. Grandin says her autism allows her to see the world in pictures; her inner thoughts are entirely devoid of language, she simply thinks in extremely detailed movies. She says her visual memory and sensitivity to details has allowed her to be so good at designing things, because details that neurotypical people gloss over are extremely important to her and end up making a huge difference in the efficiency of the final product.

Temple Grandin utilized her incredible working memory to design humane cattle-holding equipment for the agriculture industry.

Autism may not be the only example of a disorder being mischaracterized. Studies have shown that children with ADHD on average have lower IQs than neurotypical children (Kuntsi, 2003). However, in his TEDx talk, Stephen Tonti, a senior at Carnegie Mellon, discusses why he believes ADHD is not a disorder, but simply a difference in cognition. Tonti argues that by viewing ADHD as a disorder implies that it needs to be fixed. He states that his ADHD makes him better at some tasks than neurotypical individuals, and that the world needs a diversity of cognition in order to run smoothly.



Therefore, while IQ tests are intended to measure intelligence, they often only measure one type of intelligence, and are therefore biased against certain groups of people. By trying to fit cognition into a box, IQ testing disvalues cognitive diversity. This may be causing negative impacts. By telling an individual that their intelligence is low when in fact it is simply different, we could not only be holding people back, but we might also be depriving the world of a diverse group of thinkers that could solve problems from a different perspective.



Even if current IQ tests are not fair across all groups, the future of intelligence testing may be brighter; as discussed previously on the Neuroethics Blog, fMRI intelligence testing could eliminate biases in intelligence testing. By observing testers’ thought processes in action, researchers would be able to see which brain pathways a subject recruits to solve a test, and whether he or she uses a visual or verbal approach to the question, thereby observing fluid and crystal intelligence in action.





References



Binet, Alfred. (1905) L'Annee Psychologique, 12,191-244.



Bölte, S., Dziobek, I., & Poustka, F. “Brief report: The level and nature of autistic intelligence revisited”. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 39 (2009): 678–682.



Cattell, Raymond B., and Raymond B. Cattell. "The Discovery of Fluid and Crystallized General Intelligence." Intelligence: Its Structure, Growth, and Action. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987. 87-120. Print.



Dickens, William T., and James R. Flynn. "Black Americans Reduce the Racial IQ Gap: Evidence from Standardization Samples." Psychological Science 17.10 (2006): 913-20. Web.



Kunda, Maithilee, and Ashok K. Goel. "Thinking in Pictures as a Cognitive Account of Autism." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 41.9 (2011): 1157-177. Print.



Kuntsi, J., T.C. Eley, A. Taylor, C. Hughes, P. Asherson, A. Caspi, and T.E. Moffitt. "Co-occurrence of ADHD and Low IQ Has Genetic Origins." American Journal of Medical Genetics 124B.1 (2004): 41-47. Print.



Mottron, Laurent, Michelle Dawson, Isabelle Soulières, Benedicte Hubert, and Jake Burack. "Enhanced Perceptual Functioning in Autism: An Update, and Eight Principles of Autistic Perception." Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 36.1 (2006): 27-43. Print.



Raven, J., J. C. Raven, and J. Court. Manual for Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary Scales, Section I: General Overview. San Antonio: Harcourt Assessment, 2003. Print.



Serpell, Robert. "How Specific Are Perceptual Skills? A Cross-cultural Study of Pattern Reproduction." British Journal of Psychology 70.3 (1979): 365-80. Print.



Spearman, Charles E. "'General Intelligence', Objectively Determined And Measured." American Journal of Psychology 15 (1904): 201-93. Web.





Want to cite this post?



Young, E. (2013). Intelligence Testing: Accurate, or Extremely Biased? Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/09/intelligence-testing-accurate-or.html

Diagnosed with a bad case of growing up poor?

What if how wealthy your parents were before you were born and while you were developing changed who you are, how smart you are and how well you are going to do in life? Well, it turns out that your socioeconomic status during development really does affect your life that dramatically. In a recent review by Meany et al. the authors discuss how different aspects of low socioeconomic status affect childhood development. In the first part of this blog post I will discuss the findings of this article and in the second I will discuss the ethical issues of discussing this type of human condition as a disease.

Socioeconomic status' influence on development (source)

According to Meany et al. socioeconomic status has wide ranging and influential effects on the developmental outcomes of childhood development. These effects may be accounted for by three quantifiable variables: access to quality prenatal care, the quality of parental care, and the quality of stimulation from the home environment.




Prenatal care has long been established as a major predictor fetal health and body weight as well as longer-term developmental outcomes ^2,3 which have major impacts on mental health and ability. These changes can be measures using behavioral metrics such as externalization, shyness and IQ as well as anatomical changes in brain regions such as the hippocampus, the anterior cingulate and the orbitofrontal cortex ¹. These descriptions are important establishing differences from a neuroscientific prospective, but let's not get bogged down.



Parental care and the amount and quality of environmental stimulation are intertwined. Generally speaking the quality of parental care is directly related to the stress level of the parent, mainly the mother, and how much time they have to spend with eh child. A lower socioeconomic status is correlated with spending less quality time, initiating stricter and less consistent discipline. Environmental stimulation mostly comes down to the availability of books and other stimulating resources.




Now, is it fair to talk about poor people in this way?




Is it productive to catalogue all the things poor families have wrong with the way they raise children then find correlates in brain development?




We have long known that prenatal healthcare increases the health of a fetus and improves the developmental outcomes of the resulting child. We know that inconsistent discipline and a tumultuous home environment negatively impacts the development of a child. We know that early childhood education leads to long term improvement in academic scores, increased employment and decreased risk of incarceration.




The way I see it this is more or less a phrenological analysis that allows for a scientific stratification of different socioeconomic classes. As neuroscientists we need to be working on problems that can be solved and whose dissection will have a net positive effect on society.




People who grew up in a lower socioeconomic household don’t need to be cured. That is not to say that we as citizen of the world don’t need to work to improve healthcare or expand educational programs.




But I for one don’t want to be diagnosed with a bad case of growing up poor.




--Kenneth McCullough








Want to cite this post?


McCullough, K. (2012). Diagnosed with a bad case of growing up poor? The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on

, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/02/diagnosed-with-bad-case-of-growing-up.html








Sources



1. Hackman DA, Farah MJ, Meaney MJ. Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research. Nat
Rev Neurosci. 2010 Sep; 11(9):651-9. Review. PubMed PMID: 20725096; PubMed
Central PMCID: PMC2950073.




2. Meaney, M. J., Szyf, M. & Seckl, J. R. Epigenetic mechanisms of perinatal
programming of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal function and health. Trends Mol.
Med. 13, 269–277 (2007).




3. Uno, H., Tarara, R., Else, G., Suleman, M. A. Sapolsky, R. M. Hippocampal
damage associated with prenatal glucocorticoid exposure. J. Neurosci. 9,
1705–1711 (1989).




4. Kramer MS. Determinants
of low birth weight: methodological assessment and meta-analysis. Bull World Health Organ. 1987;65(5):663-737. Review. PubMed PMID: 3322602; PubMed Central PMCID:
PMC2491072.

Parental care of rodents is not the same as socioeconomic status in humans.

The question of socioeconomic status in scientific research is an interesting one. Many experiments do not take socioeconomic status into account, yet studies show that socioeconomic status can significantly alter the human brain. The article, “Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research” addresses some of these issues. However, one of the main problems I noticed with this article is the equivalence of socioeconomic status with quality of parental care. The article seems to associate lower socioeconomic status with parental neglect. Conversely, higher socioeconomic status is associated with higher quality parental care. While there may in fact be a correlation, status is by no means a perfect predictor of parental quality.

Parental care in rats (source)

One of the studies cited in the article uses lack of grooming in rats as a model for low socioeconomic status based on the idea that parental care is equated to status. However, this model shows no more than the effects of early life stress and parental neglect. It would not be appropriate to extend this to make conclusions about socioeconomic status. For one thing, rats do not have a social hierarchy, and without the concept of social status one should not draw conclusions.




Even primates with clearly defined social hierarchies do not innately have a concept of economy. It would be interesting to extend this study into nonhuman primates, but it would be necessary to introduce the concept of money into the system. A similar construct has been demonstrated by Keith Chen and Laurie Santos of Yale University. These researchers trained a group of capuchin monkeys to use money as a means of exchange. Aside from observing the first nonhuman prostitute, they showed that species other than humans can be taught the concept of money. If one were to combine this technique with a species that has a well defined, complex social hierarchy, say the Rhesus macaque, then you would truly have an animal model of socioeconomic status. Basically, rats aren’t cutting it.




--Michael McKinnon






Want to cite this post?




McKinnon, M. (2012). Parental care of rodents is not the same as socioeconomic status in humans. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/02/parental-care-of-rodents-is-not-same-as.html

Response to "Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research"

As we have witnessed firsthand through the recent presidential election campaign season, this topic is as electrifying as any, placing labels of “haves” and “have-nots”. With the notion held by some that this is due to a lack of effort or motivational drive alone, disdain is often an emotion conjured in the minds of many when discussing poverty; but, what if the differences between an individual of high socioeconomic status and lower status was more than just attitudes, but was actually manifestation of completely different thought process? What if just the idea of being of a lower socioeconomic status was detrimental or toxic to the long-term development of the brain?

Socioeconomic status might have neural effects (source)

Numerous studies have begun to bring to light evidence that perhaps motivation or will may not be the only difference between socioeconomic status (SES), but it may lie even more intrinsically. Some evidence exists that individuals of different socioeconomic status may perceive and process stimuli differently, as children of a lower SES had increased activation of the right middle frontal gyrus when attempting to learn unfamiliar rules, which is an thought to inhibit the accuracy of applying new rules (Sheridan et al, unpublished data). Although this differential processing exists, do we truly have enough knowledge in the field to declare a certain pattern of neural activation as detrimental to one’s mental processing?




Knowing this information, what can be done to rectify this? The challenges, both political (laws/ideals) and physical (equal access to education/housing/etc), of leveling the financial playing field would be astronomical. Political pressures alone would drive this issue off the deep end, as the thought of taking from the top to help the bottom has been a recurring theme among politics, but still has reached nothing but political brinkmanship. As the issue of the so-called “fiscal cliff” continues to near, it is an issue soon to be raised in the public eye once again. Perhaps knowing more about how perception changes between SES classes would allow us to better prepare educational materials for each individual.




Even if this was possible, it is folly to assume that problems of this nature would not exist in a society that keeps all individuals into a single socioeconomic class. Unequal access to resources, such as financial, nutritional and educational, may not be the deciding factor of differential neural processing. We cannot ignore other factors, such as parental care, that may have detrimental effects on neural growth and development. This article highlights some of the systemic differences seen in rodents with different qualities of parental care. Offspring that experienced lower maternal grooming and licking have higher anxiety and higher corticosterone levels than those with more maternal grooming and licking (Hackman et al, 2009). The quality of parental care may not be dependent on socioeconomic status, as parents that higher positions within a company or organization may not be available or easily accessible by their children.




Although neuroscience can play a role in elucidating the changes that occur with differences in SES, caution must be taken when attempting to examine the whole picture, as each individual may have a wide variety of reasons or backgrounds that impact neural and cognitive development. Additionally, care should be used to prevent referring to low SES as a mal-adaptive state, as that is still something that remains shrouded in uncertainty.




--Brian Prall






Want to cite this post?


Prall, B. (2012). Response to "Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research". The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/02/socioeconomic-status-and-brain.html






References




Hackman, DM., Farah, MJ., Socioeconomic status and the developing brain. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 65–73 (2009).




Hackman, D.A., Farah, MJ., Meaney, MJ., Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11,651-659.

Uncovering the Neurocognitive Systems for 'Help This Child'

In their article, “Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research,” Daniel A. Hackman, Martha J. Farah, and Michael J. Meaney explore how low socioeconomic status (SES) affects underlying cognitive and affective neural systems. They identify and focus on two sets of factors that determine the relationship between SES and cognitive development: (1) the environmental factors or ‘mechanisms’ that demonstrably mediate SES and brain development; and (2) those neurocognitive systems that are most strongly affected by low SES, including language processing and executive function.  They argue that “these findings provide a unique opportunity for understanding how environmental factors can lead to individual differences in brain development, and for improving the programmes and policies that are designed to alleviate SES-related disparities in mental health and academic achievement” [1].

Neuroscience can tell us how SES may affect her brain.

Can it move us to do something about it?

Theoretically, I have no doubt that neuroscience can make a powerful contribution to early childhood development by determining whether and which neurocognitive systems appear to be more extensively affected by low socioeconomic status.

This is, as the authors themselves point out, important work, because understanding which systems are affected can help educators and policy-makers develop programs to target them more directly and successfully. For example, the work of D’Anguilli et. al. demonstrates that low-SES children pay more attention to unattended  stimuli, and are thereby more susceptible to becoming distracted and having a harder time focusing on a given task. [2] A corresponding, corrective strategy would consist in introducing games, lessons and computer-based strategies which explicitly target executive functions – and indeed, just such a set of measures is being used by the Tools of the Mind curriculum, which as of this year is being implemented in 18,000 pre-kindergarten and kindergarten classrooms, in Head Start programs, public schools, and childcare centers across the nation.

Fig. 1: The yellow 'brain development' box represents those neurocognitive systems that are most affected by low SES, and could include 'language processing' and 'executive function'

So far, so good. So what am I worried about?



What do you think? 



I’m not ‘worried’ so much as left wondering about one issue in Hackman et. al.’s review that I would now like to explore, and that I would welcome further discussion about.



My concern relates to the broader relationship between scientific knowledge and our individual and collective moral motivation to do something about an ongoing injustice. Allow me illustrate what I mean using two diagrams adapted from the Hackman et. al. article. The first represents the state of our knowledge regarding the relationship between SES and development, without any concrete neuroscientific understanding of the neurocognitive systems that mediate between them:

Fig. 2: We know that SES affects developmental outcomes,

even if we don't understand the neurocognitive systems that mediate the relationship

The second represents the state of our knowledge regarding the relationship between SES and development, now including our emerging neuroscientific understanding of the neurocognitive systems that mediate between them, outlined in the paper:

Fig. 3: Neuroscience is beginning to elucidate which neurocognitive systems are

most strongly affected by SES, and thereby influence children's developmental outcomes

My question is this: if sociologists and psychologists have already firmly established the relationship between SES, specific environmental mediators, and resulting developmental outcomes, as in Figure 1, (and they have, as the evidence cited by Hackman’s et. al. attests to), then can the addition of a scientific understanding of the intermediary mechanisms in any way enhance or strengthen our practical commitment to improving children’s SES and the corresponding environmental mediators that affect their development?  In other words, if I already know that SES, and specifically prenatal influences, directly affect elements of children’s cognitive and emotional development, do I need to know anything before doing something about it? And will knowing more about it, including understanding the causal sequence mediating the relationship, prompt me to do anything more about it than I was doing before?



Again, as mentioned, I fully recognize and appreciate the potential of neuroscientists and their collaborators to “design of more specific and powerful interventions to prevent and remediate the effects of low childhood SES.” [1] A second, equally essential neuroscientific question to explore is whether certain brain propensities increase the likelihood of individuals' living in low-SES circumstances. Could we say that certain brain propensities correspond to developmental diseases, or to a kind of physical handicap - one that traps people in poverty and decreases their likelihood of attaining a better quality of life?  If so, would this oblige us to take action? These are fundamental questions that need to be explored further. For my part, I'm not sure I agree with the statement that neuroscience can “highlight the importance of policies that shape the broader environments to which families are exposed” with any more clarity or motivational force than our existing knowledge already does. [1]



I am a neurophile, but…

Here’s why I’m slightly skeptical.  To borrow an example from the philosopher Peter Singer, imagine that you’re driving down the street and see a person bleeding profusely from his leg. [3] You could rush in and help this man, but you’re wearing your brand new, $375 J.Crew Ludlow suit jacket, so you think to yourself, ‘Ok, do I leave him there? I mean, it’s terrible, but I guess so, because I don’t want to get blood all over my beautiful jacket.’ If you responded to the situation in this way, we would probably call you a moral monster.

One of these is not like the other. Or...?

Now consider a different case. Imagine that you’re watching your favorite episode of the Walking Dead when a commercial from Care comes on and reminds you that for $375, you could pay for and facilitate 8 healthy births, and thereby help save the lives of several mothers and their babies. Now you think to yourself "Well, I guess it would be good to save those people, but I really just want that jacket." In this case, our general consensus would be that while you're no Mother Theresa, we probably wouldn't want to condemn for being a moral monster. (After all, that jacket is made from 'world class wool'!) So what gives? As Singer pointed out in a series of influential articles, our rational obligation towards the mothers and their newborns should be the same as towards the bleeding man. [3] So how and why do our intuitions differ?

In his article, “From neural ‘is’ to moral ‘ought’: what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?,” the philosopher Joshua Greene suggests that an evolutionary perspective may help explain the differences in our responses. He proposes, “consider that our ancestors did not evolve in an environment in which total strangers on opposite sides of the world could save each others’ lives by making relatively modest material sacrifices. Consider also that our ancestors did evolve in an environment in which individuals standing face-to-face could save each others’ lives, sometimes only through considerable personal sacrifice. Given all of this, it makes sense that we would have evolved altruistic instincts that direct us to help others in dire need, but mostly when the ones in need are presented in an ‘up-close-and-personal’ way.” [4] According to Greene, this makes a sense of why human beings can be extraordinarily altruistic in their immediate, interpersonal interactions, but still gobsmackingly selfish in their transnational relations.



Unfortunately, our relationship to children in lower-SES environments is closer to the distant pregnant mothers in Singer's analogy than it is to the bleeding stranger right in front us. Few of us interact with low-SES children on a daily basis, and so many of us worry about how they get on in more abstract, theoretical terms. But if this is right, then more information, or even more scientific understanding, will not be enough to move us toward addressing their developmental issues. Rather, we will need to use other kinds of knowledge, such as our emerging understanding of biased moral motivation, to reflectively increase the probability of translating our moral principles into actions. That is, examples like Singer's bleeding stranger tell us something about how our moral motivation works, and we need to use this type of knowledge to try and make low-SES children seem more like the man with the leg wound in our moral imaginations. This would increase the likelihood of our doing something to improve low-SES children's circumstances. One way of achieving this would be to ensure that we interact with low-SES parents and their children on a more regular basis, e.g., by doing something as simple as taking public transportation. This would make us more likely to put our hard-won neuroscience research to use.

____



[1] Hackman, D. A., Farah, M.J., Meaney, M. J., 2010, 'Socioeconomic status and the brain: mechanistic insights from human and animal research,' in Nature 11, Available at https://mail-attachment.googleusercontent.com/attachment/u/0/?ui=2&ik=bb31177d51&view=att&th=13ad223ce6979971&attid=0.4&disp=inline&safe=1&zw&saduie=AG9B_P9-g3MEKF3MHUpOaKNL2td1&sadet=1355272405884&sads=-iGOQ0R2Qyb4_aHrUapR1YuvG1g



[2] D’Angiulli A, Herdman A, Stapells D, Hertzman C. 2002, 'Children’s event-related potentials of auditory selective attention vary with their socioeconomic status.' Neuropsychology 22:293–300.



[3] Singer, P., 1972. 'Famine, affluence, and morality.' Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 229–243.



[4] Greene, J. 2003. ''From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?' Nature. Available at: http://www.overcominghateportal.org/uploads/5/4/1/5/5415260/from_neural_is_to_moral_ought.pdf







Want to cite this post? 

Haas, J. Uncovering the Neurocognitive Systems for 'Help This Child'. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2012/12/uncovering-neurocognitive-systems-for.html