200th Post! Why is Neurodiversity Useful?

Neurodiversity is a term that was coined by Australian social scientist and autism advocate Judy Singer. In her 1998 thesis, she wrote: “For me, the key significance of the ‘Autistic Spectrum’ lies in its call for and anticipation of a politics of Neurological Diversity, or what I want to call ‘Neurodiversity.’ The ‘Neurologically Different’ represent a new addition to the familiar political categories of class/gender/race and will augment the insights of the social model of disability.”[1] Similar to the way biodiversity is discussed as critical to the stability of the ecosystem, neurodiversity is considered to be critical for human and cultural stability. In other words, Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and other neurological differences should be a part of our community and, thus, neither cured nor subject to intense rehabilitative or normalizing efforts. Before I discuss how neurodiversity is useful to my work and to ASD-related professions, I want to quickly review ASD and my current project for the Neuroethics Scholar Program.

Source: Cafe Press

ASD is traditionally defined as a neurodevelopmental disorder that affects a person’s social and communicative style and includes frequent displays of specific behavioral patterns.[2] There is a huge range of autistic expression, from significantly impaired to subtle displays of autistic characteristics. As the Neuroethics Scholar at Emory’s Center for Ethics, I am working on a project at the Marcus Autism Center exploring how to communicate the results of future infant screeners for ASD to parents. This project was described in The Neuroethics Blog on October 1, 2013. A neurodiverse perspective informs my work in two important ways: shaping the language I use to talk about ASD and ensuring I maintain a focus on the quality of life for ASD individuals and their families. I believe that neurodiversity can be similarly important for all professionals working with and studying ASD or related disabilities.

In American civil rights movements, there has always been a linguistic focus—people pay attention to the ways individuals with different racial, gender, sexual, and ethnic identities are labeled and described. This language changes over time, becoming more appropriate and representative. The disability rights movement also works to change the way disability is spoken about. Neurodiversity is a part of this movement, and so advocates are thinking about and promoting respectful ways to talk about ASD and related disabilities. As a whole, the disability community argues for the use of a language of difference, not deficit. For ASD, this means saying individuals have different social interaction styles, rather than “deficits in social communication and social interaction,” or prefer adhering to a specific routine, rather than “inflexible adherence to routines.” The statements communicate the same thing, however the latter is linguistically demeaning and suggests autistic people are broken or somehow less than those who are not autistic.

My use of the phrase ‘autistic people’ is also informed by neurodiversity. In the field of disability studies, there is an ongoing conversation about the use or nonuse of ‘people first language.’[4] This approach attempts to verbally demonstrate that a person is more important than the disability by using phrases such as ‘person with a disability’ or ‘person with autism,’ thus rejecting the notion that a disability subsumes a person’s entire identity. This inaccuracy is most pronounced in phrases like ‘an autistic’ or ‘autistics.’ However, there are many self-advocates who prefer the use of the term ‘autistic person’ (and also ‘disabled person’) because autism is a central element to identity formation and the phrase ‘people with autism’ seems to serve as a reminder to others that autistic people are, in fact, people. As a result of many interactions and conversations with friends and colleagues who are autistic self-advocates, I now rely primarily on ‘autistic people’ with the understanding that this phrase is meant to respect the identity of autism. 

Source: Zazzle

In this way, neurodiversity draws attention to the ways we describe autistic people that serves to stigmatize and separate this community from the non-autistic community. Eradicating this stigma by focusing on the improvement of the lives of autistic individuals rather than finding cures for or rehabilitating autism as a primary tenet of neurodiversity. This is a fairly controversial topic in the ASD community. Many parents believe that neurodiversity fails to account for autistic children who are significantly impaired. Working towards acceptance, they argue, does not help them or their children who are significantly impaired and may be engaging in self-harm, difficult to communicate with, or having persistent sleep or eating difficulties. These parents want to find ways to alleviate the most significant autistic characteristics because they and their children are living stressful and exhausting lives.

I argue that neurodiversity is useful for these families as well. Neurodiversity does not promote allowing children to continually harm themselves or families to go without sleep for days out of respect for the neurological difference of the child. Neurodiversity means improving the quality of life for autistic people and their families. An autistic person who has not developed a reliable communication method, verbal or otherwise, would benefit from learning how to get her preferences, needs, and emotions expressed. This often does involve educational techniques and interventions. Similarly, some autistic people want to work on their social skills with explicit social skill instruction. This, however, does not mean that all autistic people should be subject to intense social skill instruction regardless of their desire to make and keep friendships.

Focusing on the quality of life of autistic individuals and their families does not mean leaving them alone until the surrounding community develops a more tolerant and accommodative environment. It means discovering ways to ensure that the autistic individual has a primary role in his life decisions. It means ensuring autistic individuals are employed in environments that respect and utilize their differences and skills. It means setting up school and adult environments where autistic individuals can thrive, feel comfortable, and learn. It means finding ways to support families and caregivers of autistic children and adults so that they can focus on loving and supporting the autistic people in their lives, rather than the frustrations of finding and fighting for appropriate and supportive services and environments. 

For my current project, relying on neurodiversity will result in suggestions to ensure that telling parents about the possibility of a later autism diagnosis is done in a supportive and realistic manner. This includes not suggesting that the introduction of autism into their lives will destroy the family that they want or expect and that information about ASD is provided using language that is respectful of autistic people and their families. This information should be provided in a reciprocal, ongoing dialogue about the future of a child and the family that answers caregiver questions and directs them towards useful resources and services for both the child and entire family.

For me and my work, neurodiversity means working towards a community that respects and interacts with autistic people and people with intellectual and developmental differences. But it also means that, while working towards this goal, researchers, clinicians, and educators can and should focus on developing immediate and sustainable ways to improve the qualities of life of autistic people and their families. Neurodiversity should be presented to professionals, parents, and the public as an alternative narrative about ASD that could supplement the more medically-oriented, cure-focused way of thinking about ASD. Thinking through these approaches is where neuroethics, bioethics, and neurodiversity can come together. Although the approaches seem contrastive, there is an important common ground—that of ensuring autistic individuals and their families lead fulfilling, rewarding, and uncomplicated lives.

[1] Singer, Judy. (1998) Odd people in: The birth of community amongst people on the "Autism Spectrum". A personal exploration of a new social movement based on Neurological Diversity. Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, University of Technology, Sydney. 

[2] American Psychiatric Association. (2013) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Shapiro, Joseph P. (1993) No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement. New York: Three Rivers Press.

Suggested Resources:

1. Armstrong, Thomas. (2010) Neurodiversity: Discovering the Extraordinary Gifts of Autism, ADHD, Dyslexia, and Other Brain Differences. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.

2. Autistic Self Advocacy Network: http://autisticadvocacy.org/

3. Disability Studies Quartetly Special Topic: Autism and the Concept of Neurodiversity (open source): http://dsq-sds.org/issue/view/43.

4. Jaarsma, P & Welin S (2011) Autism as natural human variation: Reflections on the claims of the neurodiversity movement. Health Care Analysis, 20(1): 20-30.

5. Kapp S, Gillespie-Lynch, K, Sherman, LE, & Hutman, T. (2013) Deficit, difference of both? Autism and neurodiversity. Developmental Psychology, 49(1): 59-71.

6. Nazeer, Kamran. (2006) Send in the Idiots : Growing Up in Another World. Bloomsbury: Trade Paper.

7. Neurodiversity Weblog: http://www.neurodiversity.com/main.html

8. Saverese, Ralph. (2007) Reasonable People: A Memoir of Autism and Adoption. New York: Other Press.

Want to Cite This Post? 



Sarrett, J. (2013). Why is Neurodiversity Useful? The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/12/why-is-neurodiversity-useful.html

It's Complicated: Molly Crocket and Patricia Churchland Discuss the Future of the Neuroscience of Morality

Last month, as a recipient of the Emory Neuroethics Program Neuroethics Travel Award, I had the wonderful opportunity of attending the International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting in San Diego, California. The conference brought together leading neuroethics scholars from around the world and focused on the themes of moral enhancement, disorders of consciousness, and the role of neuroscience in the courtroom. (The conference was structured around three star-studded panels. For a full program, please visit here. For full videos of the panels, please visit here.) There were also five oral presentations and a poster session. As part of the event, I exhibited a poster entitled “Revising Weakness of Will: A Reply to Neil Levy,” where I challenged Levy’s use of the theory of ego depletion as an explanation of weakness of will and provided an alternate, neurocomputational account.

Presenting my poster at INS.

Photo credit: Karen Rommelfanger

As a philosopher interested in the intersection of the computational neurosciences and morality, “The Science and Ethics of Moral Enhancement” session was a particularly enlightening one for me. It brought together three leading women neuroethics scholars, Barbara Sahakian (as Moderator), Molly Crockett, and Patricia Churchland, as well as neuroethicist Julian Savulescu of the Oxford University Center for Neuroethics. It was a remarkable conversation. Throughout their discussions and even in the question period that followed, I was struck by how clearheaded the panelists were about the challenges facing the field. At the same time, and despite their very different perspectives, they evidently shared a real optimism about the future of this area of research. As the session moderator, neuroscientist and neuroethicist Barbara Sahakian of Cambridge University set the tone by explaining that the panelists would tackle, “the science of what’s possible now,” but also look at “what we may be able to do in the future.”





A Morality Pill?

Molly Crockett

The first panelist, Molly Crockett, is a leading neuroscientist working at the University College London and the University of Zurich. She is also in the process of setting up a lab at Oxford University. She explained that, as a scientist, the aim of her presentation would be to describe, “What it’s like, on the ground, doing this research.” In particular, she focused on how own area of expertise, which is in exploring how different brain chemicals influence moral behavior.



To start off, she emphasized, “It’s complicated.” She described how, in light of her work on the neurotransmitter serotonin, people often ask her about the possibility of a morality pill. She explained that she often feels compelled to point out that both the moral behaviors in question and the biological systems underlying them are very complex. For example, she noted, her research on serotonin and sociality was picked up in the media in such as away as to suggest that “Enhanced serotonin biases moral judgment and decision-making toward sociality.” While not necessarily inaccurate, she explained, she also wanted to make clear that there is a lot more going on.



In her talk, Crockett laid out three major reasons for why she believed a straightforward ‘science of moral enhancement’ would not happen overnight. First, she noted, there is ongoing discussion as to exactly what constitutes ‘moral behavior,’ and hence, what it is exactly that we would want to enhance if we could. Second, she detailed how that all the neurochemicals in question do many different things: oxytocin may enhance empathy, for instance, but also increase Schadenfreude in individuals participating in economic games.



Finally, Crockett emphasized that moral behavior is highly context-specific. For example, it is not clear that we would want to be helpful to anyone we meet, wherever or whenever. There is a technical term for this kind of individual, she noted: “Sucker.” The audience loved the joke but also certainly appreciated the point. Like cognition, morality is so complex that it cannot simply be replicated in specific circumstances.



In her own efforts to study morality, Crockett noted, she found it useful to hone in what she called “low-hanging fruits,” that is, on behaviors that almost no one would find to be morally objectionable. As an example of such a behavior, she discussed Peter Singer's dilemma regarding the duty of easy rescue, where an agent passes a drowning child and decides whether to help or not. "These are a set of behaviors we would want to target if we could," she noted.



'Before Going Whole Hog'

Patricia Churchland discusses oxytocin

The second panelist, philosopher Patricia Churchland, is Professor Emerita of the Department of Philosophy University of California San Diego. Like Crockett, Churchland emphasized that she was skeptical of the idea of a ‘morality pill’ and argued against the claim that morality could be something like a “swiss army knife” set of moral modules. But she proposed to tackle the issue from a slightly different perspective, proposing to examine some of troubling issues surrounding the frequently touted molecule of oxytocin.



Oxytocin is known to play an important role in childbirth, lactation, intimacy, pair bonding, and trust. In a recent study, researchers at Yale argued that “intranasal administration of oxytocin enhances activity in the brain for socially meaningful stimuli and attenuates its response to nonsocially meaningful stimuli in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as measured via functional MRI.” But, Churchland argued, the issue is not so simple.



To start, Churchland outlined some general problems with oxytocin and its recent popularity in both scientific research and the popular press. Its mechanisms are relatively poorly understood, it interacts with other neurochemicals, it makes female voles go into estrous, and there is very little known about the long term effects of its administration. In addition, she added, the general and unregulated availability of oxytocin makes it vulnerable to abuse. Nonetheless, the problems go even deeper for Churchland. The main body of her talk emphasized that how oxytocin is administered and measured in human beings plays a surprising role in how the molecule becomes understood, reported, and used by scientists in the field.



In human beings, oxytocin is measured by comparing levels of the molecule before and after a behavioral manipulation. For example, a plasma sample is taken, the participant is given a massage, and then a second plasma sample is taken. Researchers then compare oxytocin levels to examine the effect of the manipulation. But how is oxytocin measured in these kinds of studies? Churchland explained there are two standard ways to look at plasma and measure oxytocin. She described the first method as the ‘gold standard,’ using a radioimmunoassay to “tag the thing in question” on extracted, highly purified samples. By contrast, the second method is commercially available and relies on a much easier-to-use enzyme-linked immunoassay (EIA). But it has the disadvantage of often not producing accurate results.



In a recent paper, Michael McCullough, Churchland, and Armando Mendez compared the two kinds of assays. In addition, they tested the commercial kits independently and found that that were misidentifying all kinds of molecules as oxytocin, including vasopressin. This led them to argue that the EIAs “lack reliability when used on unextracted samples of human fluids, and that they tag molecules in addition to oxytocin, yielding estimates that are wildly discrepant with an extensive body of earlier findings that were obtained using methods that are well validated, but more laborious.”  Building on this finding, Churchland showed a rather striking comparison of data. One the one hand, she she showed how, using the ‘gold standard’ radioimmunoassay, women in late stages of labor register between 1-5 pc/ml of oxytocin in their plasma. By contrast, using the commercial kits, individuals who had merely received a massage appeared to have 200 times as much oxytocin in their blood. Despite these shortcomings, however, Churchland noted that the results achieved using EIAs are “widely cited and widely used in good faith to apply oxytocin to children with social difficulties.”



Here, Churchland made clear the ethical import of what earlier on she had acknowledged was a rather ‘technical’ talk. She noted, “if the way you’re measuring oxytocin is unreliable, you have results that are un-interpretable, then you have to ask yourself if it’s okay to be giving oxytocin to people with schizophrenia or with autism.” And then she added, “What we really need to do, before going whole hog on using oxytocin as a treatment for socially difficult children, is we really need to get this straight.”



In her conclusion, Churchland acknowledged that her talk may have sounded rather negative and, in general, a little bit too pessimistic about the neuroscience of morality. To counter this, she emphasized, “I think it can be done.” But she emphasized that it must be done with patience and care for those involved all along the way.



All in all, in was an enlightening experience. I’m already looking forward to the 2014 International Neuroethics Society meeting in Washington, DC!

Want to Cite This Post? 



Hass, J. (2013). It's Complicated: Molly Crocket and Patricia Churchland Discuss the Future of the Neuroscience of Morality. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/12/its-complicated-molly-crocket-and.html

Bias in the Academy Video Archive of Presymposium Seminars

Neuroethics Symposium December 10, 2013

Bias in the Academy: From Neural Networks to Social Networks

 

This neuroethics symposia is designed to discuss the complex influence of stereotype/bias on academia and apply advances in the science of stereotype bias to university policies and practices. Through a pre-symposia seminar series and symposia, a white paper will be produced to highlight challenges and to put forth practical solutions to move toward mitigating the detrimental influence of bias and stereotyping in academia.  

Presymposia seminar series 1/4: An Introduction to Bias: A Social Network Primer facilitated by Jacob Billings, Neuroscience graduate student, Emory University 

Presymposia seminar series 2/4: Biased People or Biased Researchers: A puzzle for Social Psychology facilitated by Chris Martin, Sociology graduate student, Emory University 

 

Presymposia seminar series 3/4: A Look at Power Structures and Bias in Academic Settings facilitated by Roger Sikes

 

Presymposia seminar series 4/4: Operationalizing the Research on Bias: Faculty Hiring and Recruitment Processes, facilitated by Dona Yarbrough, PhD, Vice Provost for Community and Diversity, Emory University

 
 

Disclaimer: 



Titles and institutional affiliation for individuals who contribute to
these seminar series are for identification purposes only. The opinions expressed
are solely those of the speakers (facilitators or audience members) and do not represent the views
of any organization that the speaker is affiliated with or with the
opinions of any other author who publishes on this blog. The material
contained on these videos represent the personal views of the individual speakers and do not necessarily represent the views of any organization
that any speaker is affiliated with or with the views of any other author
who might post on this blog. 

Neuroethics Journal Club: Neural Correlates of Negative Stereotype

Our everyday perceptions of others
can potentially be biased by cultural stereotypes. However, research has
suggested that an initial, and often negative, stereotype can be downregulated
via a highly connected neural network. While this regulatory process has been studied
under neutral conditions, for the third journal club of the semester
Neuroscience graduate student Kim Lang led a discussion about regulation of
this neural network when White individuals are not under neutral conditions,
but actually primed for negative African American stereotyping.




A recent paper published by Forbes et al. used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the amygdala, the prefrontal cortex (PFC),
and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), three highly interconnected brain regions
important for stereotyping and bias. Studies have shown that the amygdala,
involved in arousal, is activated immediately when encountering a so-called
out-group member. This first response can be downregulated though if an
individual is given time for non-biased deliberation, and this is reflected by
activation in the PFC. The OFC is the regulator of these two neural regions,
especially if initial negative stereotyping is in conflict with an egalitarian
view. Prior research has shown this amygdala inhibition by the lateral PFC
region with an experiment where White participants were shown Black faces in
either rapid succession (30 ms) or at a slower rate (525 ms). When participants
did not have time to reflect on the faces during the fast exposure speeds,
enhanced amygdala activation was observed reflecting the early arousing
response. During the slow exposure time condition though, amygdala activity was
not enhanced.  Instead, increased activity
was observed in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which correlates
with decreased amygdala activation (Cunningham et al.). This study suggests that if given enough time, a biased
view reflected in the activation of the amygdala, can be reconsidered.

Adapted from The Jury Expert

The authors of the paper for
journal club discussion (Forbes et al.)
took this previous experiment further and studied the activation of the
amygdala when White participants were exposed to Black faces at either 30 ms or
525 ms in the presence of violent and misogynistic rap (VMR) to create a
situation that is primed for negative African American stereotyping. While
evidence shows that individuals are able to downregulate the initial arousal
and response to stereotypes, researchers hypothesized that if stereotypical or
suggestive music were playing, then individuals would be less likely to downregulate
the response even if given ample time to consider the situation. In other words,
during the slow showing of Black faces in the presence of VMR, White
participants would show a prolonged amygdala response instead of a downregulation.  “Straight Outta Compton”
by NWA was rated high by participants and chosen as the song to represent Black
American stereotyping in the study. To prime for negative stereotyping, but not
African American stereotyping, participants were also asked to rate a death
metal (DM) song, since this genre of music is typically associated with White
American culture. “Only
One” by Slipknot was chosen based on a similarity in tempo and violent
references to “Straight Outta Compton.” Participants were then shown
expressionless Black and White male faces at either the fast (30 ms) or the
slow (525 ms) rate while listening to VMR, DM, or no music (NM) while the fMRI
scans were completed. After the scanning, participants were asked general
questions regarding their feelings toward the song, whether they owned any of
the songs (no participants did), and how they rated themselves on the Modern
Racism Scale³ and the Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice
Scale⁴.




Based on the responses to the two
rating systems, participants reported being non-prejudiced and motivated to
regulate their biases, and the fMRI scans of the amygdala during the slow scan
with NM reflected this. Consistent with previous work (Cunningham et al.), when participants were exposed
to the faces at the fast rate, amygdala activation was observed and during the
slow speed, OFC and DLPFC activation was recorded. When participants were
exposed to Black and White faces at the fast speed in the presence of DM, no
activation at the amygdala, OFC, or the DLPFC was observed. Similar to NM, at
the slow speed during DM, activation of the OFC and DLPFC regions was still
greater when seeing the Black faces compared to White faces, suggesting that
participants were still engaging in a deeper processing of the Black faces. The
focus of the hypothesis was the activation of brain regions in participants
when VMR was playing. As predicted, when Black faces were displayed during the
fast exposure, greater amygdala activation was observed compared to White faces.
During the slow speed, participants still showed higher amygdala activity when
seeing Black faces compared to White faces, but also increased OFC and DLPFC
activation.




When comparing results across the
two types of music and the context with no music, greater amygdala activation
was seen during the fast and slow exposures for VMR than for NM and DM. As
expected, greater DLPFC activity was seen for the fast and slow exposures for
NM and DM compared to VMR. Interestingly, when exposed to the fast speed,
greater OFC activation was seen for VMR compared to NM and DM. However, during
the slow speed exposure, the opposite was observed, and greater OFC activity
was seen for NM and DM compared to VMR. These findings suggest that not only is
there a continuum of neural processing during slow and fast social cognitive
assessments, but the lack of downregulation in the amygdala during the fast and
slow speed exposure for VMR is evidence that although White individuals can control
an initial, arousing reaction to a Black individual in a neutral context, this
is more difficult when the situation lends itself to negative stereotyping. The
authors offer two possible interpretations for this lack of downregulation in
the VMR scenario. Either exposure to the VMR causes a prolonged amygdala
response that is cognitively taxing on other neural regions, making it
difficult to control a response or the VMR justifies the initial response and
reinforces that stereotype.

From Forbes et al.

Whether a situation that is primed
for negative stereotyping makes deliberation more cognitively taxing or
justifies an initial stereotype, brain activation isn’t predictive for
behavioral responses since similar activation patterns in individuals do not
always give rise to similar behaviors. Although this study was more
representative of everyday circumstances than the previous study with neutral
conditions, it would be interesting to measure the neural activity of
individuals when encountering situations that prime for negative
stereotypes.  Even if there is typically
a lack of amygdala downregulation, does this mean that individuals still
behaviorally restrain themselves?




A second experiment that was
discussed during journal club as a potential follow-up to this paper would be
to repeat the fast and slow exposures of Black faces during the three different
musical contexts, but with Black participants instead of White participants.
“Straight Outta Compton” is not subtle, but instead overtly violent and
misogynistic, and it could be that people
of all races would have an arousing response in the amygdala that would be
difficult to regulate strictly due to the nature of the lyrics – not because
the song stereotypes African American culture. Of course it is a matter of
opinion whether “Only One” really mimics “Straight Outta Compton,” or whether
“Straight Outta Compton” is truly violent and misogynistic, so the experiments
could be repeated with more and different songs to help confirm the hypothesis
that “when something as subtle as a rap song is played in the background,”
White individuals negatively stereotype Black Americans (Forbes et al.).




More research will most likely be
done in the future, but these results do have larger implications to consider for
society today. Knowing that even in tolerant individuals with an egalitarian
viewpoint the amygdala is activated and can be difficult to downregulate, does
this mean that neural activation would justify racial violence, especially in a
court case? Should defense attorneys ever be able to claim that this activity
in a context that primes for negative stereotyping is a valid defense for a
violent or egregious crime against an out-group member? As neuroscience
research becomes more sophisticated, more debates will follow about where we
draw the line for allowing scientific research as evidence in the courtroom and
when we must hold the individual solely responsible. In the meantime, hopefully
when encountering an out-group member, we will consider that negative
stereotypical contexts may prime us for negative stereotyping due to a complex
neural interaction that is somewhat out of our control. If we are conscious
that we have difficulties mediating initial responses, perhaps more conscious tolerance
and reflection could follow a circumstance where an initial judgment seems
justified based on contextual cues.






References

1. 
   Forbes, C.E., Cox, C.L., Schmader, T., Ryan, L.
   (2011). Negative stereotype activation alters interaction between neural
   correlates of arousal, inhibition and cognitive control. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 771.
   




2. 
   Cunningham,
   W.A., Johnson, M.K., Raye, C.L., Gatenby, J.C., Gore, J.C., Banaji, M.R.
   (2004). Separable neural components in the processing of Black and White faces. Psychological Science, 15, 806–13.
   




3. 
   McConahay,
   J.B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism scale. In:
   Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., editors. Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism (pp. 91–125). Orlando,
   FL: Academic Press.
   




4. 
   Plant,
   E.A., Devine, P.G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without
   prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 811–32. 

Want to cite this post?



Strong, K. (2013). Neuroethics Journal Club: Neural Correlates of Negative Stereotype. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2013/12/neuroethics-journal-club-neural.html