Sex (in the) Machine

I have wanted to write about this issue for a few months now
and have finally gotten around to it. Science writer Kayt Sukel created a small
splash in the blogosphere in January when she wrote a few blog posts (see here
and here)
about her experiences orgasming in an MRI machine (or, as she puts it, “coming
for science”) as part of a study conducted by Barry Komisaruk and Nan Wise at Rutgers
University. Sukel’s posts were intended to serve as teasers for her book, Dirty
Minds: How Our Brains Influence Love, Sex, and Relationships (full
disclosure, I haven’t read her book yet). For an earlier account of an attempt
to “come for science” see science writer Mary Roach’s highly entertaining book,
Bonk:
The Curious Coupling of Science and Sex.

About the Research
and Its Contributions:

Barry Komisaruk
has been a pioneer in the use of fMRI to study orgasm (for an example of his
work, see here), and a
number of other researchers have also used PET and fMRI technologies to try to understand
what is going on in the human brain during sexual arousal and climax (for a
recent review of this research see Georgiadis
2012).

Komisaruk method’s are interesting – the team creates a
plastic mask for each subject based on a mold taken of her face. After the
subject puts on the mask, the mask is bolted to the scanner. This helps to keep
movement to a minimum as the subject stimulates herself to orgasm. The results
are also interesting – the team created a video
showing the changes in activation that occurred in Nan Wise’s brain as she
stimulated herself to orgasm (I’m curious if Komisaruk has ever masturbated to
orgasm inside an MRI machine). In general terms, activation occurred first in
the genital regions of the sensory cortex, then the limbic system (emotions and
long-term memory), then the cerebellum and the frontal cortex. During climax,
activity was greatest in the hypothalamus (probably related to the release of
oxytocin) and the nucleus accumbens (probably related to the release of
dopamine). After climax, activation levels decreased across the brain.

This is undoubtedly valuable research, and, as both Sukel
and Roach point out, scientists studying sexuality often face both a lack of
funding and a lack of respect when attempting to investigate questions related
to sexuality. However, I have some misgivings about the study, related to the
purpose of the research and to its ecological validity and representativeness.

Misgivings: Purpose
of the Research

According
to Komisaruk, one of the goals of the research is to understand how
pleasure works in the brain, which seems laudable. However, the goal of
understanding alone is rarely enough to get research funding, and, not
surprisingly, Komisaruk also sees “therapeutic” applications for his research,
specifically to address what he calls the “pathological” condition of
“anorgasmia.” Komisaruk is attempting to develop therapy for anorgasmia involving
neurofeedback, in which people are able to view their own brain activity on a
screen in “real time” and direct their bodies to respond.

Although this may be a useful tool for some people who are
trying to learn how to orgasm, I am wary of the language of pathology. Feminist
scholars have offered a number of critiques of the pathologization and
medicalization of benign sexual variation, pointing out that medicalization can
create unnecessary distress (why can’t I have an orgasm, why?) as well as puts
forth narrow solutions focused only on changing the individual rather than
society. I don’t have the space here to summarize these critiques fully;
instead, I refer you to the work of the New
View Campaign and to Liz Canner’s documentary, Orgasm Inc.

I will note that many women are probably already under plenty
of pressure to achieve orgasm. I will also note that some reporting on
Komisaruk’s research (for example, this
article) ties his research to the message that “sex is good for your
health,” a discourse that I have critiqued
extensively elsewhere.

Misgivings: Ecological
Validity and External Validity/Representativeness

I also have some misgivings about the ecological validity
and external validity or representativeness of this work. In terms of
ecological validity, it is always worthwhile to ask, to what extent do the
laboratory conditions approximate the real-life situation under investigation?
Probably for most women, the experience of self-stimulating to orgasm in an MRI
machine is very different from the experience of self-stimulating to orgasm in
“real life.” One of the most interesting parts of Sukel’s story is where she
talks about how she prepared for the study – for two weeks, she practiced stimulating
herself to orgasm with a bell taped to her forehead, in an effort to learn how
to bring herself to climax without moving her head. I think that because of the
poor ecological validity of this research, we would be wise to avoid assuming a priori that what goes on in the brain
during orgasm in a MRI machine is the same as what goes on in the brain during
orgasm in “real life.” In other words, we can’t just assume that an orgasm is
an orgasm is an orgasm, even within subjects.

In terms of external validity, it is also worthwhile to ask,
to what extent are the results generalizable to a larger population? Komisaruk’s
study is not the first study of the biological aspects of sexuality to raise
questions about generalizability. In the 1960s, William
Masters and Virginia Johnson undertook research into the physiology of sex.
Using a variety of instruments, they measured the physiological changes that
occurred in over 700 men and women engaging in masturbation and partnered
sexual intercourse in the laboratory. Masters and Johnson measured changes in
breathing, heart rate, genital swelling, muscle contraction, and genital color,
among other things. On the basis of their findings, they proposed a four-phase
model of “human sexual response” (excitement, plateau, orgasm, and resolution).
As many scholars have noted (Robinson
1976; Tiefer
2004; Irvine
2005), their sample was potentially biased for a number of reasons, perhaps
most significantly by the fact that Masters and Johnson studied only men and
women who were able to regularly orgasm during masturbation and heterosexual
intercourse. As Leonore Tiefer suggests, in essence, Masters and Johnson chose
women – those (few?) who were able to orgasm regularly during masturbation and intercourse – whose sexuality most
closely resembled the sexuality of men. Yet, although their sample was not
necessarily representative, their data was incorporated into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders and became the standard model of healthy sexual response. Even
today, a sexual response pattern that differs from that identified by Masters
and Johnson may be labeled pathological (Tiefer
2004).

According to Sukel, Komisaruk told her that only a few study
volunteers have been unable to stimulate themselves to orgasm in the MRI
machine. This suggests a few things – first, that maybe a fair number of women
are perfectly comfortable with, or are even turned on by, loud noises, confined
spaces, curious spectators, and immobilization devices. It also suggests that
Komisaruk’s volunteers may be a very specific type of women, with a very
particularly type of sexuality (i.e. a woman who doesn't need to use a vibrator). This itself is not a problem, the only danger
is if the sexuality of these women is established as the “norm” against which all
other types of sexuality are judged (as in what happened with Masters and
Johnson’s research).

Concluding Thoughts

Despite these misgivings, I am excited about this research
and can think of an infinite number of follow-up studies: is brain activation
similar for orgasms achieved through different types of stimulation? Is brain
activation similar for heterosexual, lesbian, and bisexual subjects? What is
the activation pattern when someone fakes an orgasm? Does a “food-gasm” produce
the same activation pattern as a “sex-gasm”?

What brain imaging orgasm studies would you propose and how
might the data from these types of studies be used to benefit society?

Want to cite this post?


Gupta, K. (2012). Sex (in the) Machine. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2012/05/sex-in-machine.html

International Neuroethics Society: Call for Abstracts

Abstract submission for the 2012 International Neuroethics Society meeting in New Orleans is now open!

 



 The International Neuroethics Society welcomes abstracts
reporting recent results in the field of neuroethics and related topics.
Investigators at any career stage are encouraged to submit abstracts.

Five submissions will be selected for Oral Presentations. Two submissions will receive a $250 Travel Award. Twenty-five abstracts will be published in the online version of American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience.

The deadline is 5:00 p.m. EDT on JULY 2, 2012. Submit your abstract to administrator@neuroethicssociety.org. Accepted presentations will receive notification by August 1.

Joshua Greene: On Neuro-Improvement, Neuroenhancement, and Chekhov

In their paper on the neuroenhancement of love and marriage, Savulescu and Sandberg argue that “there is no morally relevant difference between marriage therapy, a massage, a glass of wine, a fancy pink, steamy potion and a pill.” [1] But is this quite right? At a recent Emory Neuroethics Journal Club, participants discussed whether a distinction might be drawn between attending couples’ counseling and being exposed to oxytocin and, more broadly, whether there are differences between ‘traditional,’ conscious improvements and more immediate, pharmacological neuroenhancements. How should we go about comparing and contrasting these two processes?

Since this issue has important implications for research, treatment, and education, I invited Dr. Joshua Greene to weigh in on the debate for the Neuroethics Blog. Dr. Greene is the John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, and widely recognized for his experimental work on moral judgments and decision-making. His research focuses on the affective and cognitive processes constituting decision-making, and he is a strong proponent of consequentialism as a means for achieving rational moral outcomes. Recently, Dr. Greene presented a paper entitled “Beyond Point-And-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics” at the New York University 2012 Bioethics Conference, and took part in a panel discussion devoted to one of the conference’s two main themes: ‘Can Moral Behavior be Improved or Enhanced?’ To open up the discussion, I asked Dr. Greene about Savulescu and Sandberg’s view on improvement and enhancement.



NEB: As a philosopher and a scientist, would you argue that there are any essential or morally relevant differences between ‘neuro-improvement’ and neuroenhancement procedures?



JG: In the end, all therapies—talking, massage, pills, injections—ultimately affect behavior and experience by affecting the brain. Thus, there is no deep metaphysical difference between traditional forms of therapy and high-tech ones.  But, given our limited knowledge, the risks are different. The odds that you’re going to produce a totally unforeseen extreme harm by talking to someone about her marriage is vanishingly small. But a new pill is something for which our brains and our bodies may be unprepared.



NEB: Would you argue that either of these mechanisms is intrinsically preferable for the course of our human development, either as individuals or as a species?



JG: In principle, there’s no difference. You can imagine a pill that does to the brain exactly what an hour of talk therapy does.  But, in practice, and if all else is equal, we should be more cautious with high-tech stuff. These things have yet to be vetted by evolution.



In this way, Dr. Greene agrees with Savulescu and Sanders that there is no essential difference between ‘neuro-improvement’ and neuroenhancement. But he does emphasize that there are practical considerations pertaining to enhancement which should be taken into account. I understand this to mean that, at least for the time being, these practical factors are substantial enough to keep us from straightforwardly identifying conscious self-discipline with neuroenhancement technologies. At the same time, these principles do suggest that, once we gain a better understanding of the neural and biochemical mechanisms involved, the boundaries between ‘neuro-improvement’ and neuroenhancement will become increasingly blurred.



Next, I went on to ask Dr. Greene about the applications of improvement and enhancement in more specific contexts. Although ‘neuro-improvement’ and neuroenhancement may both be understood as forms of ‘compensation’ - i.e., as ways of making up for our sometimes less-than-ideal human tendencies - certain kinds of human behaviors and judgments are more complex than others. Correspondingly, some shortcomings will also be harder to regulate than others, and it seems likely that we will find moral intuitions and moral actions on the more challenging end of spectrum. I wondered whether the difficult case of morality could shed any light on the future of improvement and/or enhancement.



NEB: In “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” you clearly and persuasively recommend consequentialism as a way to offset our affective moral responses, and thereby pursue more rationally-informed ends (Greene, 2007) [2]. This seems to imply that we ought to change certain aspects of how we behave and even, in one sense, to change certain aspects of ‘who we are’ (Greene, 2002). If they were shown to be safe and effective, the preemptive enhancement of some of our basic intuitions and reactions could theoretically enable us to ‘bypass’ our need for conscious, rationally-guided self-correction. If they could realistically be developed, would you endorse these kinds of enhancements?



JG: Again, in principle, there could be a safe and effective pill for any job that can be done by other means.  But I don’t see on the horizon any technological fix to replace old-fashioned talking and thinking and reasoning and arguing.



I have to admit that, as a student in philosophy, my first thought was, ‘Philosophy, represent!’ But, of course, there is a lot more to Dr. Greene’s suggestion than that. If I understand him correctly, we are currently faced with a unique window for investigating scientifically-informed techniques for moral improvement: in the past, philosophy sought to improve moral judgment but was not sufficiently informed by the sciences, and in the future, we may possess enough knowledge to simply bypass improvement and enhance our moral capabilities. But for now, we are just beginning to gain enough scientific knowledge to begin improving our moral lives, and we will likely have a quite a long time at this stage before (and if) we begin to genuinely master moral enhancement.

Happily, a growing number of researchers are working to map out the relationship between neuroscience and moral improvement. Among them, Narvaez and Vaydich (2008) have sought to develop practical programs for fostering moral development in children and young adults [3]. They further argue that these kinds of programs should be deployed in schools, youth organizations and other social institutions, and I asked Dr. Greene what he thought of this approach.



NEB: Throughout much of your work, you are quite optimistic about the possibility of improving some of the ways we think. Do you believe scientifically-informed programs promoting moral development should be incorporated into the educational curriculum?



JG: This sounds good to me.  But, of course, it all depends on the details.  Mostly, I think that we should learn about the science of human nature from a young age.  One of my favorite quotes (gendered language aside) comes from Anton Chekhov, by way of Steven Pinker: “Man will become better when you show him what he is like.” I think the way to promote moral development is to promote self-knowledge, grounded in science.



NEB: What specific educational tools and programs would you like to see neuroscientists developing over the next twenty years?



JG: Behavioral scientists (psychologists, anthropologists, economists, neuroscientists, geneticists, etc.) have learned a lot of surprising and fascinating things about human nature. I think that these lessons need to be translated in to educational programs suitable for children and adolescents. In particular, students [should] be learning the basics of experimental psychology around the same time that they start to learn the basics of physics, chemistry, and biology.



I think this last proposal is especially encouraging insofar as it is both quite possible and potentially transformative. And as Dr. Greene points out, these kinds of changes could form the foundation for a more scientifically-informed theory of morality.



--Julia Haas

Emory Philosophy Graduate Student







Want to cite this post?


Hass, J. (2012). Joshua Greene: On Neuro-Improvement, Neuroenhancement, and Chekhov. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2012/05/joshua-greene-on-neuro-improvement.html




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[1] Savulescu, J. & Sandberg, A. (2008) The neuroenhancement of love and marriage: the chemicals between us. Neuroethics 1:31–44.

[2] Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant's soul, in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, Ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

See also, Greene, J.D. (2003) From neural "is" to moral "ought": what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?  Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Vol. 4, 847-850; Greene, J. D., Cohen J. D. (2004) For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B. 29 November 2004 vol. 359

[3] Narvaez, D. & Vaydich, J. (2008) Moral development and behavior under the spotlight of the neurobiological sciences. Journal of Moral Education, 37(3), 289-313.

The Effects of Altering Beliefs in Free Will: Results Wanted

As many of us might be aware, previous research has shown that having people read anti-free will text tends to lead to more cheating (Vohs and Schooler, 2008) and more aggression and less helping (Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall, 2009).



These findings have garnered a lot of attention in the scientific community and in the media. These findings have also led to a number of interesting (and sometimes heated!) ethical debates. The primary (ethical) question of interest asks (roughly): If telling people they don't have free will leads to more anti-social behaviors and less pro-social behaviors, do we as academics have an ethical duty not to publicly tell people they don't have free will? Of course, the answer to this question is very complicated and will depend on a number of factors ...

As complicated as answering this question may be, there are clearly some data that could help shed some light on the importance of this question. For example, data that may help answer the following would definitely be helpful: How consistently can these results be replicated? What are the typical effect sizes found in any attempt to replicate? How much do these results generalize to other samples (populations)? How specific are these effects to the DVs, IVs, and methods used in the original studies? In other words, in general, how robust are the findings that telling people they don't have free will leads to bad behaviors?



In an attempt to answer these questions, I am looking to conduct a meta-analysis/review of any related findings. In order to meet this end, I need to know about any unpublished findings that may exist out there, including null results. (I need a good sampling of both what has worked to get effects and what has not worked.)



So, I need your help!



If you know of anyone that has attempted to empirically explore the effects of telling people they don't have free will on behavior, please contact me. If you or your lab has attempted to empirically explore the effects of telling people they don't have free will on behavior, please contact me.



If you are willing to share, I need from you a (brief) description of your methods, including the exact manipulation used, sample size for each condition, means and standard deviations of any and all relevant measurements for each condition, and if applicable a correlation matrix. I am particularly interested in DVs that attempted to measure various aspects of behavior, along with any measurements of beliefs in free will. Also, if you have any methodological concerns in your study, it would be helpful if you noted those, too.



I can be contacted at jsshepa 'at' Emory 'dot' edu, or jason.s.shepard 'at' gmail 'dot' com.



Thank you!







Want to cite this post?


Shepard, J. (2012). The Effects of Altering Beliefs in Free Will: Results Wanted. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on
, from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2012/05/effects-of-altering-beliefs-in-free.html