The Brain In Context

By Sarah W. Denton

Sarah W. Denton is a research assistant with the Science and Technology Innovation Program at the Wilson Center. Denton is also a research assistant with the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at George Mason University. Her research primarily focuses on ethical and governance implications for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, neurotechnology, gene-editing technology, and pharmaceuticals. 

Tim Brown, University of Washington PhD student and research assistant with the Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering’s (CSNE) Neuroethics Thrust, introduced the session titled, “The Brain in Context,” at the International Neuroethics Society’s 2017 Annual Meeting moderated by Husseini Manji, Janssen Global Therapeutic Neuroscience Area Head. This session provided a multidisciplinary view of the challenges we face today in understanding the context of lived experiences and how our brains impact our environments. Getting at the heart of the context in which our brains develop and grow may help us to reduce stigma by increasing our understanding of how our environments impact our brains in a myriad of ways.

Socioeconomic Status and the Brain

Martha Farah, Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society at the University of Pennsylvania, kicked off the panel discussion by speaking about her recent research on the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and the brain. The factors affecting the brain not only arise from our physical bodies, but also include our social environments [1]. Specifically, Farah has focused her attention on socioeconomic status and how it affects everything, from life expectancy to education to income – all of which are inherently connected to the context and the environments in which our brains develop.

The way the brain develops is a causal pathway to a variety of outcomes. For instance, there is a surprisingly strong relationship between cognitive ability, as measured by IQ and school achievement, and SES [2]. Farah’s lab performed three studies that aimed to characterize SES disparities in terms of cognitive neuroscience’s model of mind, rather than through intelligence and standardized test scores [3,4,5]. Cognitive neuroscientists employ the ‘information processing’ view of the mind, which is a fundamental construct of cognitive psychology that “refers to the rule-governed transformation of [both unconscious and conscious] metal representations” (e.g., explicit perception, implicit learning, implicit memory [6]. This view of the mind appeals to computational methods in both cognitive psychology and neuroscience to understand the molecular mechanisms implicated in information processing [7].

Developed from a slide shown during Farah’s panel 

discussion titled, “Socioeconomic Status and the Brain,” 

at the 2017 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting 

on November 10, 2017 at the American Academy for the 

Advancement of Science (AAAS) building in Washington, D.C.

Farah’s findings suggest that the most pronounced socioeconomic-derived disparities were both executive function associated with the prefrontal cortex and declarative memory associated with the hippocampus. We know that the brain is usually discussed in a descriptive and mechanistic way, but this conception may be unhelpful. Although there are currently no unique implications, research moving towards a more illustrative and actionable understanding of the brain in context is adding to the weight of evidence that our environment, including SES, has profound affects on our brains. Thus, neuroethics and neuroscience policy is relevant precisely because it increases the weight of evidence. The end goal of Farah’s research program is to understand poverty using insight from neuroscience in order to help “break the cycle” and guide future policy decisions. 

Prenatal Programming of Human Fetal Brain Development 

The second panelist, Moriah Thomason, Director of the Perinatal Neural Connectivity Unit of the Perinatology Research Branch with the Detroit Medical Center and Wayne State University School of Medicine, built upon this discussion and defined the first context of our brain – the womb. Her research centers around prenatal programming of human fetal brain development and has found that alterations in brain development in utero have significant cognitive effects.

Earlier this year, Thomason published a study in Scientific Reports that suggested differences in how certain brain regions communicate with each other in fetuses that were later born prematurely when compared to fetuses that were carried to term [8].

Thomason’s research team used fMRI to determine which brain regions were involved in synchronized activity between brain regions, which suggests that these regions are well connected and share information [9]. The brain in utero is essentially in a state of becoming and sets the stage for our future abilities even before we take our first breaths outside of the womb. For instance, a mother experiencing high levels of stress seems to imprint this stress on the fetal brain [10]. This fetal programming affects the functional connectivity in the fetal brain prior to birth. Her “Prenatal Imaging of Neural Connectivity (PINC)” study has found that the prenatal stress score (depression, perceived stress, satisfaction with life, and anxiety) is correlated to fetal brain connectivity in several notable brain areas, including three subregions of the cerebellum.

Image courtesy of Pexels.

One implication of Thomason’s research is that we no longer need to limit the brain to a postnatal context– neural connectivity begins prior to birth. This suggests that prenatal brain development is intimately tied to the mother’s environment and psycho-physio state, which may have a wide range of implications that have yet to be explored. This is just the beginning for Thomason and prenatal neuro-connectivity research, and I am eager to see neuroethicists explore the implications of the brain in the context of the womb.

Do Brains Matter Using Screens?

The final panelist, Hervé Chneiweiss, Research Director at École des Neurosciences Paris Île-de-France, moved us from the brain in the context of the womb to the brain in the context of our increasing use of technology – particularly screens like those found in our phones, televisions, and tablets. The social context is perhaps the most important while we learn; yet, our increasing reliance on screens as an educational tool may hinder our ability to learn how to interact with others in our physical environments [See 11,12,13].

In this context, neuro-education has evolved from two-dimensional to five-dimensional; but now we are moving back to 2D screens. Moreover, there is a correlation between excessive screen time and the development of psychiatric disorders, lack of sleep, and impaired cognition [14]. Beyond the potential cognitive effects of excessive screen-time, Chneiweiss is also concerned about the marketing of attention, i.e., the subjection to excessive screen time in the workplace and nonmaleficence in advertising the educational benefits of brain training apps.

On the latter, Chneiweiss is particularly concerned about the vague educational benefit claims made by many apps directed at vulnerable populations like children and seniors [15]. The democratization of screens has created two new kinds of pathology: nomophobia, phobia of being without a phone; and fomo, the fear of missing out, fear of being disconnected of the social network. While these characterizations are a bit tongue-in-cheek, they highlight real problems that can significantly affect our cognitive abilities.

Image courtesy of Pixabay.

As a general rule of thumb, owning a console or tablet presents more risks than benefits, such as insomnia and social-skill development, for children under the age of six [16]. But, by the time they reach their teenage years, certain action-oriented games can indeed improve cognitive abilities such as visual attention and decision-making [17]. To address this discrepancy, we must educate children and their parents on how their brains work and how screens affect their brain functions.

Conclusion



All three panelists presented neuroscience research in the social context. Martha Farah’s presentation showed how social and other environmental factors, like income, can have significant effects on brain development. Moriah Thomason’s presentation of her research went even farther – connecting stress levels of mothers to prenatal brain development. Finally, Hervé Chneiweiss spoke on how the use of screens, like those found in television sets and iPhones, can not only affect child and adolescent brain development but can also affect how they interact in the social environments around them.
The primary takeaway from this session is that our brains do not develop in a neuropsychiatric vacuum– our social and cultural environments can have significant implications for neuroscience. In the Q&A after the presentations, I found it of particular interest that each panelist agreed that the social context is the most important context when it comes to understanding the brain and conducting neuroscientific research.

Now, as we move forward, we should approach neuroscience research and its findings in the context of our social environments if we are to create a more holistic understanding of the brain.

References

[1] M. Farah. 2012. “Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of Neuroscience,” The Annual Review of Psychology: University of Pennsylvania, 63: pp. 571-91 [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/farah-Neuroethics-The-Ethical-Legal-and-Societal-Impact-of-Neuroscience.pdf ]; B. Avants, et al. 2012. “Early childhood environment predicts frontal and temporal cortical thickness in the young adult brain,” presentation at The Society for Neuroscience 2012 Meeting, abstract can be found here: [http://www.abstractsonline.com/Plan/ViewAbstract.aspx?sKey=734b1ccd-cfcf-4394-a945-083ca58f8033&cKey=7b3e8587-f590-4d94-ae3f-e050d52e8488&mKey=%7b70007181-01C9-4DE9-A0A2-EEBFA14CD9F1%7d]; M. Mariani. 2017. “The neuroscience of inequality: does poverty show up in children’s brains?” The Guardian, (13 July) [https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/jul/13/neuroscience-inequality-does-poverty-show-up-in-childrens-brains].

[2] Martha Farah, Socioeconomic Status and Brain. University of Pennsylvania, Center for Neuroscience & Society. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/martha-j-farah-phd/research/socioeconomic-status-and-brain/].

[3] K. Nobel, M.F. Norman, and M. Farah. 2005. “Neurocognitive correlates of socioeconomic status in kindergarten children,” Developmental Science, 8(1): pp. 74-87. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Development-kindergarten.pdf].

[4] M. Farah, et. al. 2006. “Childhood poverty: Specific associations with neurocognitive development,” Brain Research, 1110: pp. 166-174. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Development-povertyassociation.pdf ].

[5] K. Noble, B. McCandliss, and M. Farah. 2007. “Socioeconomic gradients predict individual differences in neurocognitive abilities,” Developmental Science, 10(4): pp. 464-480. [https://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Development-gradiants.pdf]

[6] D. David, M. Miclea, and A. Opre 2004. “The Information-Processing Approach to the Human Mind: Basics and Beyond,” Journal of Clinical Psychology, 60(4): pp. 355,357. [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15022267].

[7] "The Philosophy of Neuroscience" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Chapter 6: A Result of the Co-Evolutionary Research Ideology - Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience. 2010. [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neuroscience/#ResCoEvoResIdeCogComNeu].

[8] M. Thomason et. al. 2017. “Weak functional connectivity in the human fetal brain prior to preterm birth,” Scientific Reports, 7(39286). [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5221666/]. Of course, these findings are preliminary, but Thomason is enthusiastic and plans to continue this research with larger sample sizes.

[9] G. Miller. 2017. “Pioneering study images in fetal brains,” Science Magazine, (9 January). [http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/pioneering-study-images-activity-fetal-brains].

[10] M. Thomason et. al. 2017. “Weak functional connectivity in the human fetal brain prior to preterm birth,” Scientific Reports, 7(39286). [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5221666/].

[11] J.E. Brody. 2015. “Screen Addiction is Taking a Toll on Children,” The New York Times (6 July) [https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/06/screen-addiction-is-taking-a-toll-on-children/]

[12] USC Center for Work and Family Life, “Sleep Deprivation in the Age of Electronics,” [http://cwfl.usc.edu/wellness/sleephandouts/Sleep_Deprivation_in_the_Age_of_Electronics-CWFL.pdf]

[13] G.S. Goldfield, et al., “Screen time is associated with depressive symptomatology among obese adolescents: a HEARTY study,” European Journal of Pediatrics, v. 175(7): pp. 909-919 (July) [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00431-016-2720-z].

[14] P. Reany. 2011. “Not Getting Enough Sleep? Turn off the Technology,” Reuters (7 March) [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sleep-technology/not-getting-enough-sleep-turn-off-the-technology-idUSTRE7260RH20110307].

[15] R. Robbins. 2016. “U.S. Cracking Down on ‘Brain Training’ Games,” Scientific American, STAT (6 September) [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-cracking-down-on-brain-training-games/]; E. Yong. 2016. “The Weak Evidence Behind Brain-Training Games,” The Atlantic (3 October) [https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/the-weak-evidence-behind-brain-training-games/502559/].

[16] K. Subrahmanyam, et al. 2000. “The Impact of Home Computer Use on Children’s Activities and Development,” The Future of Children, (Fall/Winter): Princeton University [https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/10_02_05.pdf].

[17] I. Granic, et al. 2014. “The Benefits of Playing Video Games,” American Psychologist, (January) [https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-a0034857.pdf]; D. Bavelier, et al. 2011. “Brains on video games,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 12: pp. 763-768 (18 November) [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4633025/]. 

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Denton, S. (2018). The Brain In Context. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2018/03/the-brain-in-context.html

Practical and Ethical Considerations in Consciousness Restoration

By Tabitha Moses

Tabitha Moses is a second year MD/PhD (Translational Neuro-science) Candidate at Wayne State University School of Medicine. She earned a BA in Cognitive Science and Philosophy and an MS in Biotechnology from The Johns Hopkins University. Her research focuses on substance use, mental illness, and emerging neurotechnologies. Her current interests in neuroethics include the concepts of treatment and enhancement and how these relate to our use of new technologies as well as how we define disability.

What does it mean to be conscious? In Arthur Caplan’s plenary session at the 2017 International Neuroethics Society annual meeting (Neuromodulation of the Dead, Persistent Vegetative State, and Minimally Conscious), he explored this question and how the answers may impact research and medicine. 

Concerns about the capacity for consent and what defines a true consent demand conversation. Recently, for instance, the widespread story of a man with a do not resuscitate tattoo sparked discussion about ways in which a person is able to provide consent when unconscious. This is a hard question to answer, and first we must understand the types of consciousness and how they are currently defined. Brain death is an irreversible, total loss of brain function with a complete loss of consciousness and reflexive behavior (1). The vegetative state (also referred to as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (2) is described as a state wherein the person is not brain dead but also does not demonstrate any awareness. People who are minimally conscious may appear to be in a vegetative state but, when tested, demonstrate an awareness of self and others. Minimally conscious states are the basis for the recent discoveries of communication through MRI with people who had been thought to be in vegetative states (3,4). To define full consciousness is perhaps the most difficult. It is a topic that has been long-debated by philosophers and scientists; however, in medicine, to be fully conscious is most frequently defined as to be aware of oneself, one’s surroundings, and to have the ability to respond to stimuli (5). This is often measured in healthcare settings using the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), which rates patients on eye opening, motor responsiveness, and verbal responsiveness. Based on our present definitions and understanding, while brain death is currently a permanent, irreparable state, it is possible for people who are in a vegetative state to transition into a higher level of consciousness (6). 

Image courtesy of Pixabay.

We do not have a good way to measure consciousness objectively (7). Caplan argued that until we can understand both the science and the ethics of this problem, we should not move forward with consciousness-altering technologies such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and other emerging technologies. 

New research is aiming to bring consciousness back to those who were once viewed as brain-dead, but what does this really mean? These technologies are currently unable to restore an unconscious person’s former self; rather, they transition the person into a minimally-conscious state where they are then fully aware of their functional losses. Caplan provided the example of Guillaume T (GT), a man who was recently brought out of a 20-year vegetative state through vagus nerve stimulation (8). Although this story made headlines, it was not the medical miracle that most assumed. After the procedure, GT was minimally conscious, able to move his eyes on command and lift his head, but otherwise completely trapped. Having regained a degree of awareness from having none, he died two weeks later. For Caplan, this is one of the most egregious acts in the history of research. This is an instance where success was worse than failure. 

Caplan also addressed the issue of consent in consciousness research. This concern is becoming increasingly real, as one company is now claiming to offer a way to reverse brain death (9). Given the many risks of attempting to alter consciousness in this way (most notably, that of being trapped in a minimally conscious state), we must develop a new understanding of who can consent for these trials and treatments and of who is responsible for the outcome. The brain-dead patient clearly cannot provide consent, and without good definitions and measurements of consciousness, it is hard to even conceive of what it would mean to provide families with truly informed consent. A family told that their loved one may regain consciousness is likely to imagine a far different type of consciousness than the minimally conscious state that the researcher envisions. 

So, what happens next? If the research works, a patient may now be in a state of full awareness but still necessitate full-time, total care. The family, who might have once been content with withdrawing treatment from a person who was considered to have no consciousness, would now likely be unable to do so. The resultant emotional and financial burden to both patient and family would be astronomical. 

Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Caplan reminded us that our understanding of personhood and identity will also have to change. Currently, a human subject in research is a living person. If we are to include those declared brain dead in research with the intent of reviving their consciousness, we need to consider how this impacts our understanding of a human subject. Furthermore, we must consider the potential destruction of personhood. By altering the brain in such a significant manner, we are changing a person’s identity and we do not currently know the ethical or practical impacts of these changes. 

Making meaningful progress with these technologies will hinge on the many ethical considerations Caplan outlined. Researchers will need to be aware of the risks of providing false hope; they will also need to provide greater clarity about the definitions of consciousness and their expectations for the intervention. There would need to be strict regulations as to who can carry out this type of work as well as clear definitions regarding what constitutes failure and where liability falls for failures. This work may provide a novel opportunity for a new kind of advance directive for consciousness research after brain death. This would allow the patient herself the ability to decide whether or not to be included in these studies at a time when she can be fully informed about the potential implications. Finally, there need to be clear media policies for this type of work, and scientists must speak out against the bad science in this field so that patients are not misled into paying for treatments that may have catastrophic outcomes. These are just a few of many concerns that need substantial consideration before we, as a scientific community, strive to make greater headway in the field of consciousness research. 

References 

1. Goila A, Pawar M. The diagnosis of brain death. Indian J Crit Care Med [Internet]. 2009;13(1):7. Available from: http://www.ijccm.org/text.asp?2009/13/1/7/53108 

2. Laureys S, Celesia GG, Cohadon F, Lavrijsen J, León-Carrión J, Sannita WG, et al. Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome: a new name for the vegetative state or apallic syndrome. BMC Med [Internet]. BioMed Central; 2010 Dec 1 [cited 2018 Jan 14];8(1):68. Available from: http://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1741-7015-8-68 

3. Monti MM, Vanhaudenhuyse A, Coleman MR, Boly M, Pickard JD, Tshibanda L, et al. Willful modulation of brain activity in disorders of consciousness. N Engl J Med [Internet]. 2010 Feb 18;362(7):579–89. Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20130250 

4. Fiacconi CM, Owen AM. Using facial electromyography to detect preserved emotional processing in disorders of consciousness: A proof-of-principle study. Clin Neurophysiol [Internet]. 2016 Sep;127(9):3000–6. Available from: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1388245716304357 

5. Tindall SC. Level of Consciousness. In: Hall WD, Hurst JW, Walker H, editors. Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, and Laboratory Examinations [Internet]. 3rd ed. Boston: Butterworths; 1990. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK380/ 

6. Tomaiuolo F, Cecchetti L, Gibson RM, Logi F, Owen AM, Malasoma F, et al. Progression from Vegetative to Minimally Conscious State Is Associated with Changes in Brain Neural Response to Passive Tasks: A Longitudinal Single-Case Functional MRI Study. J Int Neuropsychol Soc [Internet]. 2016 Jul 6;22(6):620–30. Available from: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1355617716000485 

7. Giacino JT, Fins JJ, Laureys S, Schiff ND. Disorders of consciousness after acquired brain injury: the state of the science. Nat Rev Neurol [Internet]. 2014 Jan 28;10(2):99–114. Available from: http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/nrneurol.2013.279 

8. Corazzol M, Lio G, Lefevre A, Deiana G, Tell L, André-Obadia N, et al. Restoring consciousness with vagus nerve stimulation. Curr Biol [Internet]. 2017 Sep;27(18):R994–6. Available from: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982217309648 

9. Johnson LSM. Reversing Brain Death: An Immodest Proposal [Internet]. Impact Ethics. 2016 [cited 2018 Jan 14]. Available from: https://impactethics.ca/2016/05/24/reversing-brain-death-an-immodest-proposal/ 

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Moses, T. (2018). Practical and Ethical Considerations in Consciousness Restoration. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2018/03/practical-and-ethical-considerations-in.html

Black Mirror in the Rear-View Mirror: An Interview with the Authors

Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

The Neuroethics Blog hosted a special series on Black Mirror over the past year, originally coinciding with the release of its third season on Netflix. Black Mirror is noted for its telling of profoundly human stories in worlds shaped by current or future technologies. Somnath Das, now a medical student at Thomas Jefferson University, founded the Blog’s series on Black Mirror. Previous posts covered "Be Right Back", "The Entire History of You",  "Playtest", "San Junipero", "Men Against Fire", "White Bear", and "White Christmas". With Season 4 released at the end of December 2017, Somnath reconvened with contributing authors Nathan Ahlgrim, Sunidhi Ramesh, Hale Soloff, and Yunmiao Wang to review the new episodes and discuss the common neuroethical threads that pervade Black Mirror.

The discussion has been edited for clarity and conciseness. 

*SPOILER
ALERT* - The following contains plot spoilers for the Netflix television series Black Mirror.

 

Somnath: My first question is: if and when we to collect neural data on people, who really owns it? In the case of "Arkangel", the parents can access and even filter it. The government stepped in to regulate it, but it was owned by a private company. Who really owns that brain data? Who can control it? Do the people own that neural data or do the companies? 

 

Sunidhi: An interesting way to think about this is to think about your current medical records. Who owns your blood test results? Neural data is physical data. It's the same thing, just extending it to the brain. Companies owning that is a serious problem because there are always private interests that can manifest themselves in dangerous ways. The data should be owned by the person whose data it is. 

 

Yunmiao: I feel that, if that’s the case, we should not upload neural data at all. It can easily be misused by others. For example, Apple announced that it is going to transfer the Chinese iCloud operation to a state-owned company on February 28th, 2018. People might worry about who will access to their personal data. Either a government or a private agency could potentially misuse the information for their own interests. Russell Poldrack and Krzysztof J Gorgolewski have suggested the advantages of sharing neuroimaging data. For example, it could maximize the scientific contribution, improve reproducibility, and promote new questions. “Big data” is a trendy phrase, and its broad application have shown promising future for various fields. However, should the potential benefits of data sharing, whether it is neural data or general personal data, outweigh the importance of ownership? Despite the ethical consideration of privacy issues, there are also pros about data sharing, especially in a scientific setting.

 

Nathan: Let’s consider the more fantastical technology. Even if you willingly give up or sell your neural data through a very thorough informed consent procedure, if there is some sort of neuro-emulation, you have a digital self. There is no control after you make that transfer of ownership. The lack of control is why it is hard for even the most libertarian of thinkers to endorse voluntary slavery. We balk at that transfer of personal ownership. And I think for something as detailed as neural data, it would make sense for it to follow the same norm.

Somnath: My next question with respect to brain data and privacy is more about public opinion and how ethicists respond to public opinion. With Google Glass, we saw that many people were really uncomfortable with brain-computer-interfaces (BCI’s) being integrated into their lives. There were two issues here. One issue was that people didn't want to have random people wearing this glass and taking photos or videos of them, which is a pretty obvious argument. And the second argument was that people were uncomfortable with what the data could be used for. But as we've seen with a lot of technologies, like with cars, people [used to be] scared of the internal combustion engine exploding. And nowadays we accept them. We walk around them very easily. We're very familiar with them. I was wondering, in the vein of the episode “The Entire History of You” where everybody has a brain computer interface that can record and store memories, do you think people would eventually be able to accept these BCI’s as normal? 

Hale: People are absolutely comfortable with these things. We saw this as cars replaced carriages, and more recently as different generations have engaged with technology as ‘simple’ as social media. Our standards of privacy have changed in only a generation or two. Many people don’t view privacy as a necessary or engrained part in everyone’s lives to the degree it used to be. But even if you engage with something like Facebook or Instagram in a restrained way and you’re not showing everything, your life can get very wrapped up in the way people are interacting in an online environment. I think newer generations, and some individuals in the older generations will engage with a neural data-based social environment, even if some people dissent to the idea. One of the most effective counterbalances to people's interest in adopting these technologies is lawful regulations. Those would have a significant effect on slowing down or stopping the misuse of these things, for the purposes of avoiding the less than desirable scenarios. Regulations can’t prevent negative consequences 100% effectively, of course. What will be important is whether we have reactive/responsive laws or preventative laws, which will probably be controlled by the speed at which these two things happen. 

Yunmiao: For example, in “Crocodile,” people do have access to neural data. One could go to the extreme. Mia (the central protagonist) essentially killed everyone who could potentially have a memory of her murder(s). On one hand, such technology might stop people from committing any crime, knowing someone might be watching. On the other hand, it might also be a threat to the society because people will feel the threat of that information getting out. 

Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

Nathan: I think an unintended consequence of something like Black Mirror is an automatic increase in acceptance in these technologies. Even though a supermajority of the episodes, like “Crocodile,” “Shut Up and Dance,” and “Men Against Fire” end in death – or worse, like the perpetual agony in “Black Museum” – it gets the story out there. Just like science fiction always has. Even if it's a morbid fascination it puts fascination into the public eye. I always see fascination inevitably garnering interest for technology to actually happen even if the first presentation of it was terrifying.

Sunidhi: I think it's just a matter of time. People watching this normalizes it. There are numerous examples of technology that people kind of rejected initially and then slowly took in as more and more people accepted it. 

Somnath: My next question is about “The Emulated Self” and focuses on storing people's consciousness against their will. In “Hang the DJ,” however, were introduced to a dating app that simulates hundreds of versions of ourselves and other people with a near perfect emulation of our thoughts feelings and personalities. It basically takes the mystery out of dating. The app then mysteriously kills off the simulations, or deletes their code, when it determines that two people could be matched. But for me that begs the question: would emulating those perfect copies of people, taking their memories away, putting them in an unknown place, and then deleting their code be unethical? Is that considered imprisonment? And does that even matter? 

Hale: You're not deleting an individual artificial intelligence within that universe, you’re deleting the entire thing at once. So you're not causing any sort of relational harm. You're not killing an individual that other individuals know and will grieve over. Everyone disappears at once within that universe. But of course, a lot of it comes down to an unanswerable question: how can we possibly know whether a simulated person actually experiences the emotions that they appear to experience? 

Nathan: Yes, “Hang the DJ” has a good outcome in the end. But I think it's unfair of us to judge that technology and the consequences of it based on a dating app when the exact same technology could be used differently, like in the finale “Black Museum.” With pretty much the same technology as the dating app, a man, whether deservedly or not, was put into a perpetual torture. Or, at least the emulation of his consciousness is. 

Image courtesy of Flickr user Many Wonderful Artists.

Sunidhi: Also, how much of it is actually deleted? Is it fully deleted, or does it continue to exist somewhere? 

Somnath: “San Junipero” showed us a positive way a similar technology was used, as a way of ensuring a good death. Or rather, a life beyond death. The episode concluded with one of the most remembered love stories in pop-culture. When the person died in the real world, a new version of that person was created in the simulation. My question is: does the company then own your life? You'd be at the whims of that company. Is that necessarily a bad thing? The people inside are living a good life even though they're dependent on this company owning them. Is it a good thing to live in a simulation or is it not? 

Nathan: It can never be a good thing as long as there is a distinction between the simulation and the real world. There was no perceptual difference between the simulation and the real world in “San Junipero.” Even so, the real world seemed to treat the simulation as something quantitatively different. The people in the simulation had different legal rights. We instinctively think of a person undergoing a change like Alzheimer’s Disease as retaining their identity. Their personality is different, their memories change, but you know it’s the same person much more than a simulation in “San Junipero,” where their personality is identical. As long as we think of a simulated world as something demonstrably different, what if you don't renew your contract with the company who built San Junipero? Then they’re entitled to terminate you. You’d die. Again. 

Sunidhi: What’s interesting in “San Junipero” is that the simulated copies still retain the same memories. Then it’s an iffy line as to how you can be different people but still retain the same memories, life experiences, etc. 

Yunmiao: I think the question is whether the simulated self is continuous with the original person, or whether it’s another life or person. What if they both exist at the same time, like in many other Black Mirror episodes? I don't think the copy, or simulated person, is an extension of the original person. I think they have their own mind, and they are their own person. Thus, the original person should not have any ownership of that emulated self. 

Somnath: My final question is about emulation. We’re pretty far away from emulating human bodies. The research is still in its infancy. When I wrote about it on the blog, the research basically said that neuroscientists are still trying to figure out how to emulate ion channels. Never mind complex neural activity or entire human beings. So why do you think the show keeps coming back to the emulated self if we’re so far away from it? Do you think it just makes for a good story, or do you think there is something more important about how the American consciousness reacts to this technology when it is portrayed in the show? 

Image courtesy of Pixabay.

Yunmiao: This is more a philosophical question. What is the self? That question has been going on for centuries, and I think this is just another perspective to view or evaluate what the self is. Do you view yourself the same as you were 10 years ago, 5 years ago, or 5 minutes later? The philosophical question sits on top of the potential technology and ethical issues.

Sunidhi: I think the whole ‘true self’ debate manifests itself in current technology. Think about Deep Brain Stimulation for depression, and how that patient changes. Are they being restored to who they were before? Is this a new person that was made by the treatment? Those questions are still present, so this might just be another interpretation of how those questions will present themselves in the future. 

Hale: I agree, and I think that people can’t help but ask themselves when they’re seeing it on the show: how will this affect me and my life? If a technology feels completely distant because you won’t see it for hundreds of years, you will only be casually interested. But these technologies are presenting a pseudo-immortality. Even now, we might be close to a point to saving our brains or brain data, if only cryogenically. One day in the future, when we have the technology to do something with that, we could digitally pop into existence again. People see this and feel it’s not within arm’s reach, but it is just beyond their fingertips. 

Nathan: I’m more of a skeptic when it comes to this technology possibly ever bearing fruit. But I still think that, even if it is completely fantastical, it’s important to get into the public consciousness. Science fiction as much as fantasy can serve as an allegory for the questions we are really asking. Like Yunmiao said, questions from immortality to identity and personhood. It’s a lot easier to enter the conversation if you’re asking, ‘What if I upload myself to Star Trek?’ (as in “USS Callister”) instead of, ‘what if I misrepresent myself on Facebook and my boss thinks I’m someone completely different?’ 

Image courtesy of Flickr user

FrenchKheldar.

Somnath: People with backgrounds in ethics have had a visceral reaction to Black Mirror.Black Mirror is made more intriguing and more constructive when we have real discussions about the cross-pollination of fiction and the real world.

Proponents of these technologies, like those who are trying to make emulation happen, often contend that our hesitancy is driven by fear. They contend that progress is impeded by hand-wringing ethicists. We can’t ignore that the show brings a fascination to all these technologies, regardless of the grim consequences. That's why ethicists do need to respond to the show. Ethicists do better when they get out of their ivory tower. At the same time, pop-culture phenomena like

Before we close, I have to ask: favorite episodes? For me, “White Bear” was the most fascinating for the neuroethical implications. But as a consumer, “The Waldo Moment” is my favorite. 

Yunmiao: “White Christmas” 

Hale: “USS Callister” 

Sunidhi: “Men Against Fire” 

Nathan: “Hated in the Nation”

Want to cite this post?

Ahlgrim, N. (2018). The Neuroethics Blog Series on Black Mirror: Black Mirror in the Rear-view Mirror - an Interview with the Authors. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2018/03/black-mirror-in-rear-view-mirror.html