Consumer Neuroscience vs. Skepticism: An Inside Look at the Challenges of a Novel Field

By Ibrahima E. Diallo

Neuromarketing image courtesy of flickr user cmcbrown 

A few years ago, I read a New York Times article that really caught my attention. The article detailed the emergence of a technique that would allow marketers to “make ads that whisper to the brain.” The notion that researchers could probe my mind seemed like an exciting yet frightening proposition. As I read the article, it piqued my interest to learn more about “neuromarketing.”

What is neuromarketing and how does it work?

Consumer Neuroscience, also commonly referred to as Neuromarketing, is a relatively novel field, which uses neurophysiological techniques, such as brain imaging and electroencephalography, in order to gain insight on the decision-making process of the consumer. Consumer Neuroscience often utilizes not only brain imaging techniques, but also biometrics to gather data related to consumer behavior and decision-making (Ariely & Berns 2010). The data collected is used to gauge cognitive interest, memory activation, and emotional engagement in consumers to advertising stimuli; these data are used to optimize the advertisements and advertisement-related materials (Trabulsi et al. 2015). One way neuroimaging data for consumers is used is to shorten commercial advertisements to the parts that are the most impactful and engaging components to the consumer; this is an approach that saves a lot of money for company advertising campaigns since commercial slots can be costly (Trabulsi et al. 2015).

The field’s reliance on neuroimaging technology, and electroencephalography (EEG) has raised many questions about the validity of the research methodology. Neuromarketing has been the subject of controversy among neuroscientists and ethicists (Murphy et al. 2008). There are concerns about attempting to map a set of specific cognitive processes related to consumer behavior, which has been viewed as commonplace in the field; this concern has led to cases of reverse inference, which is deemed as a weak form of deduction within the scientific community. Reverse Inference is viewed as problematic to neuroscientists in particular because there has been little success in tying higher cognitive functions to specific brain areas that are activated and viewed using current brain imaging (or EEG) technology. There are also ethical concerns regarding privacy and the agency of consumers (to be discussed further below) that are exposed to advertisements that have been optimized by consumer neuroscience (Ulman et al. 2014). Due to the potential ethical ramifications, France has taken a stern approach by banning all commercial applications of neuroimaging (Ulman et al. 2014).

 The Concerns Surrounding Neuromarketing

The ethical issues that are a major concern also include: scientific validity of neuromarketing, the integrity of neuromarketing firms, lack of regulations and protections of consumers against harms like loss of privacy and consumer autonomy (Murphy et al. 2008). Others argue that a consumer’s power of resistance will be left unaffected by consumer neuroscience techniques (Levy 2009).

In my view, the results show a respectable amount of promise. The research methodology behind the field could be likened to the medical field’s use of prescription drugs. There are many prescription drugs that yield positive results for patients, but have poorly understood biological mechanisms. Neuromarketing does appear to “work” for marketers as seen by increased revenue, online buzz  and engagement with media and content related to optimized ad campaigns (Ohme & Matukin 2012). The results driven approach employed by the field may not please scientists, who are asking a different set of questions and have a different set of goals than neuromarketers. Neuromarketing is still in its infancy and must continue to seek to refine its methodology and replicate its results in order to full its potential.

 Gaining Insight from Experts

 In an effort to gain more insight on Consumer Neuroscience and the ethical questions surrounding the discipline, I interviewed two consumer neuroscience experts: Dr. Manuel Garcia-Garcia and Dr. Rebecca Von Der Heide. Dr. Garcia-Garcia is a former director of neuroscience for Nielsen Consumer Neuroscience, a leading consumer neuroscience firm. He is currently a senior vice president in research and innovation at the Advertising Research Foundation and an adjunct professor of consumer neuroscience at New York University. Dr. Rebecca Von Der Heide is currently a director of neuroscience for Nielsen Consumer Neuroscience. Dr. Von Der Heide has a research background in social cognitive and affective processes recently publishing her academic work in peer-reviewed journals such as Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, Journal of Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, and Brain: A Journal of Neurology.

First, I asked how they define consumer neuroscience and/or neuromarketing since there has been much confusion about the terms being used interchangeably.

Dr. Garcia-Garcia (GG): Consumer Neuroscience is the application of neuroscience knowledge and tools in consumer research. Some people define neuromarketing as the application and the former as the academic field, however I think neuromarketing is just a most pop-culture way of naming the discipline.

Dr. Von Der Heide had a more nuanced view that described the terms differently, but noted that the terms have been used interchangeably by academic and business colleagues.

Our brains respond to advertisements, image

courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Dr. Von Der Heide (VDH): There is a lot of variation in the way these terms are applied. I frequently hear them used interchangeably by academic and business colleagues as well clients – often with little differentiation. From an academic perspective, I have read arguments for potential points of differentiation, but there seems to be no general consensus. One point of differentiation that does seem meaningful is that “neuromarketing” implies the practice of marketing informed by neuroscience, whereas “consumer neuroscience” implies research on consumers using neuroscience methods (rather than practice). In addition, my personal view is that the term consumer neuroscience most explicitly captures the consumer research I am involved in on a daily basis. As a relatively young field of study, the term ‘neuromarketing’ has had a bit of an unfortunate history in that it has not always been associated with a demand for high-quality scientific research. The term “consumer neuroscience”, on the other hand, explicitly emphasizes the fact that my primary responsibility along with the other 19+ Ph.D. and/or M.D. level neuroscientists in my company is to design and implement scientifically grounded neuroscience studies that lead to insightful results. 

As I described, I see a lot of promise in neuromarketing and I wondered how one becomes credentialed to conduct neuromarketing research and how they utilize their neuroscience backgrounds. Both Drs. Garcia-Garcia and Von Der Heide are PhD-level neuroscientists who were able to extrapolate their previous laboratory research to their work in neuromarketing.

VDH: I actively apply my doctoral and postdoctoral training in neuroscience daily in my research activities. One of my primary responsibilities is designing studies that can address scientifically sound hypotheses, isolate key factors that have an impact on consumer response, and provide insights to questions that clients have about their brand or products from the perspective of consumers. Expert training in neuroscience and research design not only allows me to understand how to create studies that help clients understand key factors, but where there are current limitations in testing. In my role, it is also absolutely critical that I understand the limitations on interpretations of the study data in order to provide guidance on how to accurately interpret results. My training also allows me to be able to place the results of the research studies I work on in a broader framework of knowledge and research in the field of neuroscience. 

Following my postdoctoral training, I began searching and applying for faculty positions. During that search, I found an ad for my current position as a director of neuroscience for Nielsen and it piqued my curiosity. I was invited to interview and participated in a lengthy series of discussions with several well-respected members of the neuroscience leadership team (e.g. Robert Knight from UC Berkeley who is an active and influential force in the way we approach the scientific study of consumers in our company). I was thoroughly impressed by how scientifically grounded, innovative, and forward-thinking the position and company that I would be working for would be and it made me re-consider taking a more traditional route in my career. To make my decision more difficult, the same week I was offered my position with Nielsen Consumer Neuroscience, I was also offered a faculty position. It was a difficult choice, but I decided to accept my current position and the rest is history – 2 1/2 years later, I love my job and I know I made the right choice. It is an exciting time to be an expert in a field that is cutting-edge and constantly advancing. I also enjoy working directly with my clients. 

While Dr. Von Der Heide says that she enjoys how deeply scientifically-grounded her job is, I wanted to ask her about how she managed skepticism of the methodologies and concerns related to mind-reading and even mind-control.

VDH: Yes, I am familiar with these concerns. Just as in academic research, leaders and researchers in the field of consumer neuroscience have a responsibility to protect the rights of the consumers that participate in research. One way my company does this is by using procedures that are also used to protect the rights of research participants in academic research. For example, our research procedures, protocols, and consent forms undergo an IRB review by an independent company. We also obtain informed consent from all of our research participants. As a corporate member of the Neuromarketing Science & Business Association (NMBSA), we also agree to conform to their code of ethics, which is modeled after ESOMAR’s (World Association of Opinion and Marketing Research Professionals) code of ethics. 

Traditional methods used in advertising include focus groups,

image courtesy of Articulos Comundo

The notion that the technology used in consumer neuroscience can “read people’s minds” or “control their thoughts” is a misconception. Brain activity is measured and analyzed to understand how consumers are responding at a level that can’t be captured by traditional methods (surveys, focus groups, etc.) or articulated by consumers when they are asked about it. A primary goal of this approach (as it is also with other traditional research methods) is to get a better understanding of how brands can clearly engage and communicate to consumers and what obstacles might be preventing that connection from being effective. The goal is not to mislead consumers and neither the technology being used or the application of the results from this technology strips consumers of their free will or results in the mind-control. 

Dr. Garcia-Garcia simply states that these experiments allow companies “to infer the levels of certain cognitive or emotional states, such as concentration, arousal, etc. We are not able to read anyone's thoughts through these techniques.”

I also wanted to know how neuromarketing firms maintain a balance between providing proof of scientific validity and protecting organizational project assets. In other words, I expect that often their work cannot be published in peer-reviewed journals.

GG: Scientific discoveries do not only need to be discovered but also validated and replicated. If one vendor develops its own system and does not share it with anyone that means it has not been replicated and therefore it is not valid or reliable. Most vendors used the same metrics with better or worse optimization, based on scientific discoveries that have been replicated multiple times in the scientific peer-reviewed literature. However, they keep it private because of IP (Intellectual Property) reasons but most people in the field know what they use. 

Dr. Garcia-Garcia believes that only highly replicated based methodologies in peer-reviewed journals are used, but Dr. Von Der Heide describes the challenges of finding that balance.

VDH: It is a difficult balance and for me, it is a big difference from my academic research where I can publish all of the details of my studies. My company would not have long-term clients and repeat business if we couldn’t validate our metrics and also, clearly show the unique value of our data and insights to clients. That being said, most of our work for clients cannot be shared broadly because of contractual restrictions. One way my company has tried to address this limitation is to partner with our clients on studies with results that are able to be shared more broadly (e.g. our 2014 Bilingual Brain Study). Another way is collaborating with academic researchers and organizations on external projects that might be able to demonstrate the validity and unique value of this field. 

 Moving Forward? 

What’s next on the horizon for neuromarketing? Both experts believed that convenience and simplicity would need to be optimized.

GG: I hope to see the introduction of more portable and non-intrusive wearable devices that allow for a research with much higher face validity.

VDH: Mobile technology is constantly advancing and I am looking forward to seeing how that new technology will continue to impact the field of neuroscience (including consumer neuroscience). I think it will be a large contributor to the ability to measure participant response in real-world settings where it once was not feasible. I also think the ability to store and process increasingly large sets of data quickly will continue to improve and just as we have seen over the last several decades, provide new opportunities to rapidly and powerfully analyze and extrapolate learnings from data. 

The Consumer Neuroscience field’s ties to the business world contribute to its results-based approach; this approach seems to be at odds with the scientific community’s goal to understand the mechanisms behind consumer behavior. The difference in approach is what is propelling skepticism from the scientific community. Consumer Neuroscience has many questions to answer before the scientific community and general public might view the field as legitimate or without concern. The field could benefit from a formal regulatory body with stricter guidelines and to ensure that ethical standards are upheld by consumer neuroscience firms. Although the Neuromarketing Science & Business Association (NMBSA) has a code of ethics that firms must follow the regulations and I believe that the guidelines must be more detailed in order to construct and preserve a more uniform standard for consumer neuroscience firms.

These guidelines would be necessary in protecting the autonomy of consumers such as increased privacy protections for data collected through neuromarketing. A transparent regulatory body could alleviate some of the ethical concerns associated with the field and could subsequently provide a superior standard for quality control to protect research subjects as well as consumers of the neuromarketing services. The regulatory body must be proactive in providing guidelines that emphasize future developments in the field since these developments--such as brain imaging techniques that may allow for more detailed collection of cognitive information--might necessitate greater concern. In addition, with the multitude of commercial devices also collecting cognitive behavioral and EEG data for example, in aggregate might one day be able to produce very detailed and personal information about individuals. Firms having access to brain imaging and biometric data along with other detailed personal information could spark a greater concern for privacy. Although there are many questions that are left unanswered, the field is relatively new and many, including myself, feel that there are more promising developments over the horizon.

References

Ariely, Dan, and Gregory S. Berns. "Neuromarketing: the hope and hype of neuroimaging in business." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11.4 (2010): 284-292.

Fisher, Carl Erik, Chin, Lisa, Klitzman MD. 2010. Defining Neuromarketing: Practices and Professional Challenges.Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 18(4), 230-237.



Levy, Neil. 2009. Neuromarketing: Ethical and Political Challenges, Ethics & Politics XI, 2, 10-17.

Murphy, Emily R., Judy Illes, and Peter B. Reiner. "Neuroethics of neuromarketing." Journal of Consumer Behaviour 7.4-5 (2008): 293-302.

Ohme, Rafal, and Michał Matukin. "A Small Frog That Makes a Big Difference: Brain Wave Testing of TV Advertisements." Pulse, IEEE 3.3 (2012): 28-33.

Trabulsi, Julia, Manuel
Garcia-Garcia, and Michael E Smith. "Consumer neuroscience: A method for
optimising marketing communication." Journal of Cultural Marketing Strategy 1.1 (2015): 80-89.

Ulman, Yesim Isil, Tuna Cakar, and Gokcen Yildiz. "Ethical Issues in Neuromarketing:“I Consume, Therefore I am!”." Science and engineering ethics (2014): 1-14. 

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Diallo, I.E. (2016). Consumer Neuroscience vs. Skepticism: An Inside Look at the Challenges of a Novel Field. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2016/01/consumer-neuroscience-vs-skepticism.html

Integration without reduction: What the philosophy of empathy can learn from mirror neurons

by Georgina Campelia

Georgina Campelia is currently a Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy at the Graduate Center, CUNY, working under the supervision of Virginia Held. Her dissertation, “Virtue’s Web: The Virtue of Empathic Attunement and the Need for a Relational Foundation,” develops an account of empathic attunement, defends its status as a virtue, and sketches a relational ontology of virtue that would better accommodate the relationality of this and other important virtues.

Georgina is currently an affiliate instructor at the Montefiore Einstein Center for Bioethics, where she teaches in their Certificate and Masters Programs. She also serves on the Steering Committee at the New York Society for Women and Philosophy (NYSWIP) and is a co-organizer of SWIPshop (a workshop for feminist philosophy).

As the lack of empathy in the world has become particularly apparent and troubling in light of the resistance to offering asylum for Muslim refugees (see this recent article from The Guardian), perhaps it makes sense that the study of empathy is booming (Coplan, 2014; Decety, 2012; de Waal, 2009). Philosophers question and defend its moral worth (Bloom, 2014), psychologists and primatologists consider its nature and origin (Hoffman, 2000; Waal, 2012), and neuroscientists explore its metaphysical structure (Singer, 2009; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Empathy offers a distinctive ground for interdisciplinary work and, yet, little has been done to advance cross-field communication. While some popular work offers broadly incorporated perspectives (de Waal, 2009), and there are some anthologies that include multiple disciplines (Coplan & Goldie, 2014; Decety, 2012), there is room for more robustly integrated research.

Image of a baby macaque imitating facial expressions, courtesy of Wikimedia.

Experiments on mirror neurons began with the objective of understanding goal-directed movement and action-imitation using monkeys (Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Di Pellegrino et al. found that many of the same neurons that were active when the monkey performed an action (e.g. grasping a piece of food) were also active when the monkey observed an experimenter performing the same movement. The fact that there were motor neurons that were active when a monkey merely observed another’s action seemed to strongly suggest some kind of empathic mechanism.

The discussion around mirror neurons continues to evolve (see a response from Catmur et al. here and special AJOB Neuroscience issue edited by Jean Decety here), but communication across disciplines is still lacking. This is especially true of philosophy and neuroscience. On the one hand, the philosophy of empathy largely neglects the findings of experiments that study mirror neurons or the general networks of brain activity that reflect some kind of mirroring the other or feeling with the other (Coplan & Goldie, 2014; Slote, 2007). To ignore these findings is to ignore our own physicality and, potentially, to imply that empathy is merely ‘substantial,’ ‘non-physical,’ ‘mental’ (i.e. not real). One reason for unease here rests on how such assumptions maintain the dualisms and binaries that many feminists have sought to resist. If empathy is ‘merely’ mental, emotional, feminine, it is all too easy to discount its epistemic, moral and metaphysical import. On the other hand, much work in neuroscience and cognitive science seems to proceed with a notion of ‘empathy’ that is not fully analyzed and rarely questioned (Singer & Lamm, 2009; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Why think that some affective resonance in witnessing a partner’s pain (Singer, Seymour, et al. 2004) is a matter of empathy rather than sympathy or compassion? Does it not pain me to see a refugee tripped by a camera-person even though I can’t possibly know how that feels (i.e. empathize)? How are we to differentiate this form of affective resonance from actually understanding how another feels (i.e. empathizing)? This vagueness holds many dangers, including the epistemic and moral injustices that arise in conflating empathy with sympathy and other forms of affective responsiveness. The assumption that fMRI imaging proves empathic understanding (i.e knowing how another feels) (Singer, Seymour, et al. 2004) when it could be sympathy or compassion instead (merely feeling badly for another), could be used to justify the false assumptions of empathy that deepen marginalization and dehumanization, e.g. a politician’s claim to understand (and empathize with) the plight of a Syrian refugee while denying asylum. As Singer and Lamm’s more recent evaluation of the current status of the social neuroscience of empathy suggests, there is reason to proceed with caution and make efforts to enhance differentiation (Singer & Lamm 2009).

Further, there is work on both sides that is guilty of overly extoling or too quickly dismissing the connections between mirror neurons/systems, empathy, and moral value. For instance, Jesse Prinz argues that empathy is “not necessary” for morality (Prinz 2011), which is a far cry from it having no role in morality (or even a substantial role depending on the definition of empathy). Similarly, critiques of mirror neurons in cognitive science sometimes neglect the space between mirror neurons as the basis of action theory and mirror neurons as completely devoid of import to cognition (see Gregory Hickock’s recent book review from AJOB Neuroscience here). The pitfalls on all sides are troublesome, but all the more reason to find means of reflective integration. In particular, I have found that work in neuroscience on mirror neurons may help to challenge atomistic views of the self. Studies of mirror neurons and mirror systems suggest that, at least at times, self and other are not easily divisible. In empathizing (or otherwise affectively mirroring), we engage with others in ways that are more integrative of feelings, perspectives, and subjective experiences, i.e. more deeply relational.

Children shown images of painful accidents have activation

of some pain circuits in the brain. Image courtesy of Wikimedia.

As suggested above, multiple studies have found that “vicariously experiencing pain activates part of the neural network that is also activated when we are in pain ourselves” (Singer & Lamm, 2009, p. 85). In one such experiment, Singer et al. (2004) studied the reactions of participants to a partner experiencing pain by using fMRI to measure patterns of neural activation. As Singer & Lamm conclude, “The results suggest that parts of the so-called pain matrix (Derbyshire, 2000)… were activated when participants experienced pain themselves as well as when they saw a signal indicating that their loved one would experience pain” (Singer & Lamm, 2009, p. 85), also formerly discussed on the blog here.

First, while this work does not conclusively demonstrate empathy, it does support the claim that we can ‘feel-with’ (Code, 1995). In other words, when we observe another in pain, can mirror the person’s affective state (at least to some degree), thus engaging in some level of empathic resonance (even if we cannot fully understand how the other feels). While much work must be done regarding the methods by which we achieve such mirroring and what that mirroring amounts to (e.g., could it be that we are only projecting ourselves into the experience of the other?), we certainly and at the very least see a minimal level of interconnected brain states. Rather than avoidance, neglect, or detached perception, connections reliably develop between experiential states. This is not to say that we feel the other’s emotion, but we can and do feel-with the other to some extent or another.

Second, this research presents a picture of the self that does not only externally react or respond to others, does not only cognitively consider the experiences of others and then respond (as in theory-theory of mind) (Baren-Cohen, 2011; Zahavi & Overgaard, 2012), but rather possesses an internal experiential state that regularly emotionally engages with and reflects the experiences of others. This fits with phenomenological and psychological claims about empathy’s role in development and day-to-day interactions with others (Code, 1995; Hoffman, 2000; Keysers, 2011; Slote, 2007; de Waal, 2009). If, as these accounts suggest, we are so continuously and deeply affected by the emotional experiences of others, then we have some reason to conclude that the self is developed in relation to others and persistently connected to the experiences of others as many feminist theorists have contended (Bartky, 1997; Code, 1995; Fricker, 2007; Held, 2006; Kittay, 1999; Nedelsky, 2011; Tietjens Meyers, 1997; Whitbeck, 1983).

This is not to say that all mental states are so connected, or even mental states beyond the experience of pain; we simply do not yet know. Further, while there is a significant degree of overlap, there is also a significant degree of distinction in the two neurological processes (self-experience and vicarious experience), and we still know very little about the specific functions of the relevant brain areas (nevermind individual neurons and networks). However, these studies suggest a greater degree of affective interconnection than originally supposed by a vast amount of neurological, psychological and philosophical literature.

Ultimately, if we are more deeply relational selves, then the relations we hold with others matter to who we are and to our moral responsibility [1]. For instance, according to most ethical theories, a politician who spouts anti-Muslim views could be responsible for psychological harm and maybe, with some stretching, for physical harm that results from others acting on those views. But a relational view of the self and a relational ethics will offer something different. In addition to the harming of other individuals, the politician could be responsible for forming uncaring relationships. In particular, perhaps we can say that the fault lies in the failure to develop empathic connections with those who need them most. In this way, the wrongdoing of the opposition to accepting refugees can be said to be a failure of empathic engagement. The politician does not really try to understand how the refugees feel and, therefore, does not take the subjective experience of the refugee seriously. This is a substantial form of disrespect and dehumanization that is only available once we take relationality and empathy seriously.

Now, as some philosophers have argued, one might say that the politician’s stereotypes obstruct empathy (Prinz, 2011) and that empathy is or becomes impossible (Goldie, 2014). Without the ‘is’ we cannot get the ‘ought’ claim off the ground. However, neuroscience largely suggests that stereotypes do not necessarily prevent empathy. Positive stereotypes can enhance empathy (Jussim, Harber, Crawford, Cain, & Cohen, 2005; Lewis & Hodges, 2012). And even the research that suggests that empathy is affected by in-group and out-group biases fails to demonstrate that these biases are immovable or impossible to overcome (De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2010; Lewis & Hodges, 2012). Thus, any obstruction to empathy that stereotypes might provide does not necessarily excuse empathic failure. In fact, given the relational view above, it calls all such dimensions of empathic relationships into the bounds of individual responsibility.

So, while the main question here is an ontological one and, therefore, largely leaves open questions about if, when and how we should engage empathically with others, it does lead us toward new dimensions of responsibility and wrongdoing. These are dimensions of our ethical lives that dig into our psychological relations with others and plunge us into broader ethical concerns. Can a human rights framework of justice ultimately succeed if it obligates tolerance but not empathic or otherwise caring relations? Similarly, might a strong handed focus on the principle of autonomy ultimately steer medicine deeper into the abyss of consumerism and liability rather than into structures of caring and affectively engaged relations? Ultimately, it will be a reflective integration of philosophy and neuroscience, not a reduction to one or the other, that leads us to ask these very important questions and gets us on the track of providing more comprehensive answers.

[1] Here, I do not make any claim that a relational account of the self is holistic or collectivist as it is in some Eastern Philosophy (Chan, 1999). Further, taking relationality seriously does not entail that we are mere nodes of relations (as in some postmodern sociology, e.g. (Taylor, 2001). Nor does it entail a loss of individuality or individual responsibility, as relations can still be embodied.

Bibliography

Baren-Cohen, S. (2011). The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty. Philadelphia: Basic Books.

Bartky, S. (1997). Sympathy and Solidarity: On a Tightrope with Scheler. In D. T. Meyers (Ed.), Reminists Rethink the Self. Oxford: Westview Press.

Bloom, P. (2014). Against Empathy. Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum. Chan, J. (1999). A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China. In J. R. B. Bell & D.A (Eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Code, L. (1995). Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. New York: Routledge. Coplan, A. (2014). Understanding Empathy: Its Features and Effects. In A. Coplan & P. Goldie (Eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.

Coplan, A., & Goldie, P. (Eds.). (2014). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

De Dreu, C. K., Greer, L. L., Van Kleef, G. A., Shalvi, S., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2010). Oxytocin promotes human ethnocentrism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(4), 1262-1266.

Decety, J. (Ed.) (2012). Empathy: From Bench to Bedside. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goldie, P. (2014). Anti-Empathy. In A. Coplan & P. Goldie (Eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Haraway, D. J. (1991). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge.

Held, V. (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jussim, L., Harber, K. D., Crawford, J. T., Cain, T. R., & Cohen, F. (2005). Social reality makes the social mind: Self-fulfilling prophecy, stereotypes, bias, and accuracy. Interaction Studies, 6, 85-102. 

Keysers, C. (2011). The Empathic Brain: Christian Keysers: Social Brain Press. Kittay, E. (1999). Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. New York: Routledge.

Lewis, K. L., & Hodges, S. D. (2012). Empathy is Not Always as Personal as You May Think: The Use of Stereotypes in Empathic Accuracy. In J. Decety (Ed.), Empathy: From Bench to Bedside. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Nedelsky, J. (2011). Law's Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law. New York: Oxford University Press.

Prinz, J. J. (2011). Is Empathy Necessary for Morality? In A. Coplan & P. Goldie (Eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (pp. 211-229). New York: Oxford University Press.

Singer, T., & Lamm, C. (2009). The Social Neuroscience of Empathy. The Year in Cognitive Science, 1156, 81-96.

 Singer, T. Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain. Science, 303, 1157-1162.

Slote, M. (2007). The Ethics of Care and Empathy. New York: Routledge. Taylor, M. C. (2001). The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tietjens Meyers, D. (Ed.) (1997). Feminists Rethink the Self. United States of America: Westview Press.

de Waal, F. (2009). The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society. New York: Three Rivers Press.

de Waal, F.  (2012). Empathy in Primates and Other Mammals. In J. Decety (Ed.), Empathy: From Bench to Bedside (pp. 87-106). Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Whitbeck, C. (1983). Feminist Ontology: A Different Reality. In C. Gould (Ed.), Beyond Domination. Towota, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld.

Zahavi, D., & Overgaard, S. (2012). Empathy without Isomorphism: A Phenomenological Account. In J. Decety (Ed.), Empathy: from Bench to Bedside. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Zaki, J., & Ochsner, K. N. (2012). The neuroscience of empathy: progress, pitfalls and promise. Nature Neuroscience, 15(5), 675-680.

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Campelia, G. (2016). Integration without reduction: What the philosophy of empathy can learn from mirror neurons. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2016/01/integration-without-reduction-what.html

“Fetal assault” and later environment effects on child development: using neuroscience as a tool for political policy

By Carlie Hoffman

Premature infant, courtesy of Wikipedia

“Crack babies,” “crack kids,” and the “lost generation” were all terms used by the public and the press in the 1980s and 1990s to describe children born to mothers who used crack-cocaine during pregnancy. Supported and spurred on by the media’s interpretation of preliminary research performed by Dr. Ira Chasnoff, among others, these children were often born prematurely, had tremors and a small head circumference, and, based on their description in the press, were expected to have neurobehavioral deficits, reduced intelligence, and deficits in social skills. These children were also anticipated to cost educational and social systems thousands of dollars as they matured and entered into schools and eventually the workforce.

Yet, after additional studies have been conducted and as the “crack babies” have grown into adolescents and young adults, it has been found that the negative outcomes widely described by the media were overreaching and unsupported. “Crack babies” did not, in fact, present evidence of severe, broad problems with social development and cognitive functioning and did not prove to have the predicted detrimental social and financial effects on the school system. Instead, many of these children have grown into successful adults over the past two decades. Dr. Claire Coles, a researcher responsible for producing the first studies that challenged Chasnoff’s findings, thought the era of the “crack baby” had finally come to an end. However, as Coles discussed during the December Neuroethics and Neuroscience in the News journal club, “crack babies” and similar stories about children exposed to opiates, have resurged in recent media publications (seen here and here) and are rearing their heads once again.

Misinterpretation of research has accompanied this resurgence of concern about the effects of prenatal drug exposure, and such misinterpreted findings have been used to support media sensationalism and alterations in public policy that are often punitive toward women. While Dr. Chasnoff described infants exposed to cocaine during pregnancy as having a low birth weight, a small head circumference, and shorter length, Dr. Coles challenged these findings by pointing out these symptoms can also be used to characterize babies born prematurely. Additionally, the prematurity that often accompanies the birth of babies exposed to drugs in utero likely does not arise solely from prenatal drug exposure. As Coles stated, cocaine abuse, like other drug abuse, rarely occurs in a vacuum and several factors surrounding cocaine use may contribute to premature birth. Oftentimes, pregnant women using cocaine also have a low socioeconomic status, abuse other substances, live in a stressful social environment, and experience an overall negative maternal lifestyle. It has been shown that maternal poverty has a detrimental impact on the developing infant, with gray matter volume being positively correlated with social class in children aged five months to three years (though increased brain size is not always an indicator of improved intelligence). All of these factors, in addition to cocaine use, are likely to contribute to premature birth and the associated negative outcomes that Chasnoff observed in prenatal cocaine infants.

The body of Coles’ work indicates that drug use (not limited to the use of cocaine), poverty, and lack of social support are harmful both during pregnancy and once the child is born, and that cocaine alone does not affect infant growth or cognition. However, while Coles found that a majority of the characteristics ascribed to “crack babies” could not be attributed to cocaine use alone, she did find some alterations in child development resulting from cocaine use during pregnancy. Namely, cocaine exposure leads to persistent changes in the child’s stress response and alterations in amygdala activation during arousal regulation (reflecting a difference in the ability of the child to adjust and allocate mental resources for multiple interacting stimuli). Additionally, alterations in brain connectivity and structure have been recorded in children exposed to cocaine; however, little to no functional difference has been affiliated with these changes.

A government campaign to warn against

cocaine use, courtesy of Wikipedia

After other researchers, Coles included, performed additional studies examining the effects of prenatal exposure to cocaine, Chasnoff realized his initial findings overstated the detrimental effects of cocaine on the developing infant. Yet, by the time Chasnoff realized his error and attempted to recant his strong early statements, it was too late. During the 1980s and 1990s, when Chasnoff’s research was first popularized, the nation was also battling a cocaine epidemic. Chasnoff’s claims supporting the negative effects of prenatal cocaine exposure fit into the public’s desire to discourage the growing popularity of cocaine, and, as a result, Chasnoff’s findings were quickly accepted as true. Despite Chasnoff’s revised statements and the presentation of Coles’ findings that collectively lessened the damage caused by prenatal exposure to cocaine, the notion of the “crack baby” was already well established in the media and in the collective mind of the public and thus was not easily eliminated. The media sensationalized findings that reinforced the public’s beliefs and fit into their collective social consciousness, and suppressed the later findings that refuted that claim.

As evidenced by the “crack babies” case, once ideas that fit into cultural stereotypes take hold, they are hard to remove and often are used to inform social and political policies. Research into the negative effects of all manner of substance abuse on the unborn infant has been used to support an increasing trend toward punishing “fetal assault,” a term used by people interested in legislating women’s behavior during pregnancy, with certain behaviors (including substance use) potentially being classified as child abuse. While the purpose of such legislation is often cited as preventing substance abuse and discouraging negative maternal lifestyle during pregnancy (essentially scaring moms into becoming clean), the effective outcome of such laws is often to turn women using substances during pregnancy into criminals instead of people needing medical care. As a result, pregnant women often become afraid to seek treatment for their drug use due to the legal repercussions they will likely face, potentially causing more damage to their developing fetus.

Attempting to prevent fetal assault has given rise to several laws throughout the United States, with many being written and enforced based on preliminary research or over-interpretation or misinterpretation of research findings. One such law in Tennessee allows women to be arrested or lose their children if they are found using drugs or other substances while pregnant. Alabama’s law, referred to as the “chemical endangerment of a child,” allows a mother found using substances during her pregnancy to receive one to 10 years in prison even if her baby is born healthy, a longer sentence if her baby is born with developmental or cognitive problems, and potentially life in prison if her child dies after birth. The state of Wisconsin can take jurisdiction over an unborn child if a woman poses a substantial risk to her child and does not exercise self-control during pregnancy. In South Carolina, one woman had a miscarriage after using cocaine while pregnant and was arrested for murder. While such laws often lead to negative outcomes for both the mother and her child, these laws are often not equitably enforced, with women of lower social economic status often being punished more often than women in higher social classes.

In discussing Chasnoff and his findings with Dr. Coles after her talk, she clarified that “[Chasnoff] was never an advocate of taking legal action against women. He was, in fact, a very early advocate of fairness in this area.  He was speaking in good faith, although I disagreed with the interpretation of his early findings.” She also stated that “the media hysteria and how people get caught up with that" played a large role in sensationalizing the negative effects of cocaine on the fetus and contributed to the laws made pertaining to this issue. “The context of the problem was the media and the societal attitudes toward the problem and the punitive legalistic response to the problem, particularly in regards to women, poor women, women of color, and women’s reproductive choices.  This kind of thing has not changed and is still a terrible issue.”

There is a complex relationship between science and the

media, courtesy of Wikipedia 

Taking all this into consideration, Coles asked how scientists should share their findings, what the ethical issues for neuroscientists in providing information to the public are, and how scientific findings, such as those reported by Chasnoff, should affect social policy. As evidenced in the case of the “crack babies” and their affiliated political ramifications, harmful repercussions can come from the dissemination of scientific claims lacking validity and support. The initial use of the “crack baby” label in the 1980s and 1990s caused women to lose possession of their children, children exposed to cocaine in utero to have difficulty being adopted, any abnormal behaviors of “crack babies” during infancy and in educational settings to be interpreted entirely through the lens of their early cocaine exposure, and affected the self-perception of the children themselves.

The dissemination of unsupported scientific claims is a problem we continue to face in many forms, with more recent examples being the link between infant vaccination and autism and people only using 10% of their brains. Neuroscientists have an ethical responsibility to be precise and careful with what they say, being cognizant of the effects their claims can have on the media and on society at large. The relationship between science, the media, and social policy is complex and must be handled with care. It is the responsibility of the scientist to help people (both the public and policy makers) understand what their scientific findings mean and what their findings are actually showing, and also to suggest potential solutions to social problems instead of simply providing fuel to feed these problems. Neuroscientists are in a unique position to speak to the media and shape what information they disseminate to the public. As a result, scientists need to make sure they are saying things correctly and taking into consideration both how their science is going to be perceived and the current social climate. The media often seeks to isolate elements from scientific literature that support popular opinions without critically examining such information. Yet, after misrepresenting such scientific findings, the media will likely move on to the next fad and leave behind a mess of misinformation that scientists are left to clean up. Thus, it is in the best interest of scientists, and in the best interest of the public, to be careful with what they say. For all of us, as consumers of the media, we must be willing to objectively consider scientific evidence that conflicts with the current social climate instead of only accepting claims that fit in with our current stereotypes and political opinions. Misrepresentation of scientific findings can lead to wide-scale misunderstandings and social and political repercussions-- an outcome that is definitely within our power to prevent.

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Hoffman, C. (2016). “Fetal assault” and later environment effects on child development: using neuroscience as a tool for political policy. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2016/01/fetal-assault-and-later-environment.html

Responsibility: Revis(ion)ing brains via cognitive enhancement

By Shweta Sahu

The Statue of Liberty, an iconic symbol of

American opportunity; courtesy of Wikipedia

Most every parent wants their child to grow up to be a neurosurgeon, a lawyer, or the next gen Mark Zuckerberg. That was especially true in my case, as a first generation child. When I was two, my parents came to the United States, "the land of opportunity," seeking the success that they had only heard about in India. I grew up hearing their stories of hardship when they first moved here with an infant, without a car, without any extended family, and knowing very little working English. I witnessed them struggle tirelessly to make a life for themselves and they always said that without education you are nothing and will be no one. As a child, while my friends would go to sleepovers and camping trips with friends, my dad would spend time checking my math problems on the white board at home and my mom would make me spell 50 words correctly every night. But even with all that pressure, I never had the best GPA, I had to work incredibly hard to stay above the class average, and I almost always fell short of their expectations. So given the opportunity, would my parents have tried to enhance my cognitive ability?

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is one intervention, particularly in the DIY community, which is becoming increasingly popular in hopes of achieving enhancement of cognition, though it is not available clinically for this express purpose. While it has been deemed safe in the short term from 10,000 trials of adults, studies (like this one and this one) indicate that tDCS does not result in significant enduring improvements in cognitive performance.

To do or not to do

Dr. Anjan Chatterjee asks, “If we have the ability to make brains better, should we do so when there is no acute 'disease?'” He calls such enhancement administered by the neurologist “cosmetic neurology.” In his article, Chatterjee contemplates “ways in which medicine might make bodies and brains function better by modulating motor, cognitive, and affective systems.” The definition of “enhancement” is a moving target: what is deemed worthy of treatment is characterized as disease, whereas that which is only modified is known as enhancement. Ideas about the line between enhancement and therapy are dictated not only by medical professions, but also influenced by culture.

Dr. Chatterjee suggests that one of the ethical dilemmas surrounding the issue of enhancement is manifested in safety, since most medications and treatments have side effects. He notes that “in disease states one weighs risks [like death] against potential benefits,” but asks whether enhancement is worth the risk in healthy patients who simply wish to become even better.

However, in reality, little is known about the long term effects and true benefits of interventions like tDCS in typically-performing (not considered diseased or disabled by the medical community) individuals. Dr. Martha Farah, a renowned cognitive neuroscientist, notes that much of the research currently published on existing pharmacological enhancers may need to be taken with a grain of salt, because a) many studies used small sample sizes that could have easily led to false conclusions and b) enhancement outcomes *in laboratory experiments* differ based on biological and psychological traits of the user.

Schematic of transcranial magnetic stimulation,

courtesy of Wikipedia

Even less is known about effects on children, though there are experiments indicating potential success. In one experiment in London, 12 children with mathematical learning disabilities were given nine 20-minute training sessions, 6 of whom wore the cap (but did not receive stimulation) while the other 6 received transcranial random-noise simulation (tRNS), which is a newer transcranial stimulation method that utilizes a randomly varied current. “In this case, the children moved their bodies from side to side to guide a ball on a screen to land at a certain point on a number line, with the difficulty increasing as they progressed.” Results indicated that “children who received stimulation showed greater progress in performance [and reached a 20% higher level on the game] than did the controls, as well as significant improvements in general mathematics test scores.”

But whose responsibility is it to decide whether one receives treatment?

In their article, Brain stimulation for treatment and enhancement in children: an ethical analysis, Dr. Hannah Malsen et al. argue that because such intervention may include “compensatory trade-offs” or functional cognitive losses, more emphasis should be placed on parental judgment of the child’s best interest if the child has a neurological disease and is in need of treatment. However, in absence of disease, then more weight should be placed on the child’s autonomy, since one cannot justify the need for enhancement as was deemed necessary in the treatment case.

But how do you know a child would have wanted enhancement in the first place? At age 10 is he/she equipped with the information necessary to make such a decisions with such potentially profound impacts? I know I sure wasn’t as a 10 year old. Even now, I still cringe every time class registration time comes around because I know that small choices like what classes to take and when have enduring impacts on my career. Say the child took the opportunity and turned out successful—would he/she be glad he/she received enhancement? Would his or her quality of life be the same or better?

Would the child be the same person, at the end of the day?

This is another dilemma Chatterjee addresses—one of “eroding character” and “altering an individual,” and if “such interventions threaten essential characteristics of what it means to be human.” Taking a step back, most of us can relate to this and wonder, if we do modify a person’s state or prescribe antidepressants and other drugs, then aren’t we fundamentally altering a person and keeping them from being who they are, or are we instead enabling them to become their best selves? When someone is chronically on a drug, who is to say they would make different decisions if they weren’t always on said drug? If we believe that our actions define us, then how do we know that we are not, in fact, slowly changing the person and not just their temperament or their personality? I personally think that prolonged use of a drug does change a person. Take, for example, the case of antidepressants, which are known to protect people from the adverse effects of stress. The prolonged use of antidepressants could cause someone to make different decisions than they normally might have when they felt stress, and if these different decisions lead to different actions, then yes, I think you are altering a person by prescribing them a chronic drug. Others, however, do not share my opinion. In a qualitative case study done by interviewing parents of children with and without cognitive disabilities, it was found that some parents actually justified their child’s use of [ADHD] medication and felt that the “drugs were facilitating the expression of their child’s identity, not changing it.” Again, in the case of enhancing children, we’re led to wonder how we might be altering the trajectory of the development of the child’s personality and temperament: some believe that personality is set at a young age, which leads us to question whether there is an age after which enhancement may be less likely to alter personality, since the brain and personality, are less malleable after youth.

Is the decision to choose something like tDCS actually a choice?

First generation students sometimes feel pressure to succeed

academically; image courtesy of flickr user Tim Pierce

Linda Geddes reports, “There are currently no laws in either Europe or the US to regulate the use of tDCS in people merely hoping to enhance cognition, and companies now sell the tDCS headsets online,” thus enabling those who choose the DIY route. In fact, with a bit of science background, coming up with your very own tDCS invention is a surmountable feat with common household materials, since it is essentially two sponges hooked up to a battery/ power source! In the competitive culture today, might parents feel the need to utilize any intervention they can to improve their child’s chance of succeeding? Perhaps the stakes are too high? Parents raising first generation American children like my own for instance, might feel additional pressures. A first generation student myself, I used to always question why I received so much pressure from my parents. Now, I realize it’s because they just want me to succeed and to not have to struggle the way they did just to put food on the table, so pushing me to succeed in academics was their utmost priority. They knew I wasn’t the brightest Crayon in the box, but given the chance, would they have considered enhancement? Has society influenced our need to enhance ourselves or our children because we know that, as Chatterjee suggests, “to not take advantage of cosmetic neurology might mean being left behind?” Is it a parental responsibility to enhance their children? Are we creating a new culture of millennials who will one day want to similarly enhance their children?

I asked my parents if they would have done so and somewhat surprisingly, they said no. At first they agreed and said there’s always the risk of further complications and you potentially risk more than you can gain. Moreover, they noted that since I didn’t have any known deficits or explicit neurological shortcomings, then no they would not go for it because it wouldn’t be worth it. Finally, my mom stated that every parent’s main wish is that their kids just be safe and happy, and that academic success was only a means to achieve happiness. She would never do anything to threaten that (and she viewed that such enhancement might do so), even if it means having an “ordinary” daughter when she wanted an extraordinary one, because to her, I am extraordinary.

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Sahu, S. (2015). Responsibility: Revis(ion)ing brains via cognitive enhancement. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2016/01/responsibility-revisioning-brains-via.html