The 2014 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting

By Mallory Bowers




On November 14, the International Neuroethics Society convened for its annual meeting at the AAAS building in Washington, D.C. I had the pleasure of attending and presenting at INS through the generous support of the Emory Neuroethics Program. The society is an interdisciplinary group of scholars - including lawyers, clinicians, researchers, and policy makers - and the 2014 agenda reflected this diversity in expertise.




The conference opened with a short talk by Chaka Fattah, the U.S. representative for Pennsylvania’s 2nd congressional district. As a Philadelphia native, I was excited to learn that Congressman Fattah was an architect of the Fattah Neuroscience Initiative, which was an impetus for developing the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative.

Courtesy of Gillian Hue

Discussion of the BRAIN initiative continued through the following panels, “The BRAIN Initiative & the Human Brain Project: an Ethical Focus” and “The Future of Neuroscience Research & Ethical Implications”. Panelist Stephen Hauser spoke about the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, while Henry Markram discussed the Human Brain Project – the European-based research collaboration to establish innovative neurotechnologies and develop a more thorough understanding of the human brain. Representatives of several scientific funding institutions (Dr. Tom Insel – Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, Dr. George Koob – Director of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and Dr. Geoff Ling – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) discussed the progress of neuroscience research, while emphasizing the need for continued advancement. Although the morning panels were interesting (as a behavioral neuroscientist, seeing Dr. Tom Insel was quite thrilling), I was left with the impression that the scientific “establishment” was only beginning to scratch the surface of the neuroethical implications of the research being conducted by scientists like myself. I wondered if any of the morning panelists attended the later sessions, which discussed more neuroethically hard-hitting issues, such as “Neuroscience in the Courts” and “Neuroscience and Human Rights”.



In the session “Neuroscience in the Courts – International Case Studies”, presenters considered how neuroscience has been used in the courtroom across the globe, specifically, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and Singapore and Malaysia. In particular, speakers examined the “my brain made me do it” defense used by adolescent defendants in criminal trials. This defense uses research on the developing prefrontal cortex of the adolescent, thought to be responsible for impulse control and executive function in mature adults (Blakemore and Robbins 2012), to explain criminal behavior. In the following session, “Neuroscience and Human Rights”, I was particularly struck by Dr. Mariana Chilton and her work on the neuroscience of food insecurity. While Dr. Chilton uses scientific research to demonstrate the deleterious effects of hunger on mental health, she advocates for an antidote that extends beyond science to include public policy.



The conference concluded with an hour long poster session after oral presentations by INS abstract awardees (our own Ryan Purcell presented on the ethical implications of the brain training program Lumosity). My poster, “Feminist neuroethics: biological determinism, agnotology, and overlooked risk factors for PTSD” examined potential alternative factors, besides “innate” neurobiology, that might explain the difference in prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among men and women (lifetime prevalence of PTSD is approximately 10-14% in women and 5-6% in men in the United States (Breslau, Davis, et al. 1991, Kessler, Sonnega, et al. 1995)). Sociocultural conditioning may be one possibility. Men and women are differentially conditioned according to expected gendered behaviors from birth. Epidemiological data demonstrates sex/gender differences in the prevalence of PTSD according to specific categories of trauma, but not others (Kessler, Sonnega, et al. 1995). This indicates that it is not merely the presence of trauma, but the interpretation of trauma that precipitates development of PTSD. If trauma severity - shaped by an individual’s unique perception/interpretation - influences risk for PTSD, and perception is gendered according to sociocultural conditioning, then researchers need to address whether specific forms of gendered sociocultural conditioning precipitate risk for PTSD. Furthermore, as diagnoses of psychiatric disorders (including PTSD) rely on clinician-defined suites of symptoms catalogued in the DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) rather than biomarkers, these diagnoses could be influenced by subjective and implicit gender stereotypes. Finally, the stress of microaggressions (Sue 2010) related to gender bias and discrimination could exert long-term ramifications, potentially contributing to rates of psychiatric disease like PTSD, as research demonstrates that pre-trauma risk factors like life stress predict PTSD (Yehuda 2004). I concluded my poster by advocating for an alliance between the sciences and humanities, who can provide a rich knowledge on how sociocultural factors shape conceptions of not only gender, but also illness.

Mallory presenting her poster (Courtesy of Gillian Hue)

Although scholars approaching neuroethics with a feminist lens seemed to be a small contingent at INS, reception to my poster was enthusiastic. Fellow feminist neuroethicist Vanessa Bentley had an especially exciting poster where she examined the evidence in favor of and against a sex/gender differences in size of the corpus callosum. Bentley’s analysis surmised lack of a sex/gender difference in the size of the corpus callosum. Bentley further argued that neurosexism perpetuated a conclusion to the contrary.



My hope is that the area of feminist neuroethics will continue to grow and be represented at forthcoming INS meetings and elsewhere, particularly in light of the recent NIH call to study both male and female experimental subjects. Historically, biomedical studies have not included female animal subjects to avoid the potential confounding variable of the estrous cycle. While a more balanced approach is a step in the right direction towards more comprehensive research, the field should be cautious in the design and interpretation of such studies, in order to avoid blind reinforcement of sex/gender-based biases – in particular, biased notions of how sex/gender may interact with behavior. Feminist empiricists’, bioethicists’, and neuroethicists’ critiques will be instrumental in helping the biomedical field move forward in an ethically and scientifically rigorous way, in light of the recent NIH mandate.



I would like to see feminist neuroscience studies impacting not just the laboratory but also the broader implications of the science as I describe with my work and the impact on clinical care. I would even see it relevant or as a key discussion under the theme of “neuroscience and human rights” at future INS meetings. If neuroscience is used as a tool to underline sex/gender differences in cognition, empathy, sexual behavior, parental investment, etc. – characteristics that have been used to disenfranchise women for centuries – then the work of the human rights field may invaluably inform future discourse. I look forward to participating in future INS events to continue to further my own neuroethical inquiries and to intersect with other sub-disciplines.






References




Blakemore, SJ and Robbins, TW (2012) Decision-making in the adolescent brain. Nat Neurosci 15: 1184-91.



Breslau, N, Davis, GC, Andreski, P and Peterson, E (1991) Traumatic events and posttraumatic stress disorder in an urban population of young adults. Arch Gen Psychiatry 48: 216-22.



Kessler, RC, Sonnega, A, Bromet, E, Hughes, M and Nelson, CB (1995) Posttraumatic stress disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey. Arch Gen Psychiatry 52: 1048-60.



Yehuda, R (2004) Risk and resilience in posttraumatic stress disorder. J Clin Psychiatry 65 Suppl 1: 29-36.






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Bowers, M. (2014). The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on

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Media and social stigma can influence the patient adaptation to neurotechnologies and DBS

By Daniela Ovadia



Daniela Ovadia is the co-director of the Neuroscience and Society Lab
in the Brain and Behavioral Sciences Department of the University of Pavia and is the scientific director of Agenzia Zoe. 



Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is one of the oldest neuromodulation techniques; it was approved by the FDA in 1997 for the treatment of essential tremor, and a few years later, in 2002, the indication was extended to the treatment of Parkinson’s disease and dystonia (in 2003). In 2009 a new era for DBS started when the FDA also approved it as a therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Some patients experienced a very good outcome, while others were less
lucky and experienced side effects such as cognitive, behavioral or
psychosocial impairments. DBS is now a common procedure for the
treatment of many motor and behavioral impairments.
As certain patients associations and civil liberties groups claimed that psychosurgery was back, and with it the social control on the patient’s mind, the media became interested in the topic. With the aim to protect the use of a promising technology, scientists and researchers also became involved in the field.



In this recently published article, authors Mecacci and Haselager focus their attention on the conceptual framework influencing the lack of compliance (or maladaptation, as they define it) to DBS implants. They identify two key elements determining patients expectations toward the effects of this neurodevice: mind-brain dualism (or, at the opposite, a braincentric point of view on human nature and behavior) and a hype in presenting potential benefits of new neurotechnologies. Both can modulate the patient’s expectations and influence the clinical and adverse effects of the device. But even if the authors cite the role of the media in shaping the public perception of new brain technologies and in building common knowledge about them, Mecacci and Haselager don’t delve deeply into the topic.




The scientific literature published on this issue offers an interesting point of view on the cultural determinants of biological responses to treatments. While reviewing 1,256 articles on different neurotechnologies published from 1994 to 2005 in the UK and USA lay press, Eric Racine noticed that 68% of the articles presented clinical or non-clinical benefits, while only 28% presented at least one scientific or ethical issue. Neurostimulation (as DBS) was depicted with a more variable tone of voice than other neurotechniques such as fMRI. The articles on DBS offered a broader point of view with many more “grey areas” often related to an implicit or explicit analogy with old psychosurgery techniques. The knowledge of the unfortunate outcomes of previous psychosurgical techniques, such as transorbital lobotomies, seems to be quite common among the lay public, and this appears to influence the media approach to DBS, at least when psychiatry use is discussed. More interestingly, many articles on DBS depict the brain under the framework of neuroessentialism and a combination of biological reductionism and enthusiasm for neuroscience research; the brain is the self-defining essence of a person, a sort of secular equivalent to the soul. Fixing the brain, we also fix the mood and the personality of the patient. Neuroessentialism can easily induce hype and excessive expectations regarding the effects of the brain implants, and can create a cognitive dissonance with the common instinctive adherence to dualism, as described by Mecacci and Haselager. Under these premises, maladaptation can be interpreted as disappointment in the results obtained after surgery, which are not as good and stable as imagined.




The neuroessentialist description of how the brain works evokes the idea of a machine that can easily be repaired, while the fluctuation in motor performances and mood after DBS implants can be perceived as a confirmation of the dualistic nature of the human being. The contrast between what was imagined and reality deeply influences the adaptation of patients to the device. This explanation fits perfectly with the so called hype cycle for new technologies, which starts with a peak of inflated expectations, followed by disillusionment, and ends in a plateau of adaptation to reality. Even if the hype cycle has been conceived to describe the creative process of researchers in science, it can be applied to patients dealing with new neurotechnologies where pros and cons are discovered on a daily basis.

From The Economist

There is a strong relationship between scientists’ perception of the opportunity offered by a new treatment and the expectations of the patient, and the hype is often generated by the scientists themselves. Many studies on the news cycle, from the scientific paper to the press release by scientific institutions to the final destination (the general media, passing through the desk of the journalists) demonstrate that the first source of the media are the scientists and the press releases. The media follow the “feelings” of their sources, which are not always balanced and neutral. Patients educate themselves and build their expectations in health issues from non specific sources, especially television, newspapers and internet. They are influenced by the media, who are the first source of their knowledge. In a previous work I considered the way the media reports on ethical issues related to DBS and the responsibility that journalists and scientists should feel toward the patients who have to decide if and when to undergo DBS. Very few articles discuss or mention the opportunity to use DBS in a vulnerable population such as Alzheimer’s patients (for memory enhancement) or psychiatric patients (such as in obsessive-compulsive disorders or Tourette syndrome). By supporting medical and scientific innovations without dealing with ethical issues, the media induce implicit ethical approval without an appropriate discussion both to society and to scientific community. This support also influences the selection of patient candidates for brain implantation.




The establishment of common criteria for patient selection in DBS is one of the main issues debated by the scientific community. In a review on ethical and social issues related to DBS by Bell and colleagues, the authors affirm this while analyzing the medical literature on this topic:

Important ethical and social challenges exist in the current and extending practice of DBS, notably in patient selection, informed consent, resource allocation, and in public understanding. These challenges are likely to be amplified if emerging uses of DBS in psychiatry are approved.

In a study on a sample of 36 patients who underwent DBS surgery for motor or psychiatric diseases, 2 patients reported unfavorable opinions on the outcome (5.5%) despite a significant improvement measured with proper clinical evaluation scales. The authors explain these negative judgments with an excess of expectations from the patients regarding the magnitude of the treatment effect. This result is consistent with previous studies on the outcomes of DBS that demonstrate that not only do a patient's expectations influence the satisfaction for the treatment, but the opinion of the caregivers do as well.




In patients affected by Tourette syndrome, the desire to avoid the social stigma related with the symptoms can also influence the effects of DBS. Servillo and colleagues report the case of a 36-year-old woman driven to continuous modifications of the stimulator settings by her mother who wasn’t satisfied with the results. She wanted her daughter completely freed from tourettic behavioral symptoms to avoid the social stigma, but not to relieve the symptoms.




The role of stigma in inducing the patient to choose a surgical treatment with DBS, especially in psychiatric conditions, has been highlighted also by Schlaepfer and Fins, who stressed the role of both media and doctors in shaping patient expectations.
More research is needed on the interaction between the cultural and conceptual framework of the patients towards new neurotechniques and the social determinants of this interaction. The hype cycle, nourished both by the media and scientists, is probably one of the most powerful. Ethicists should be aware of the way this cycle can determine the outcome of a treatment, but it can be modulated by a good procedure to obtain an informed consent.






References




Bell, E. et al. 2009. Preparing the ethical future of deep brain stimulation. Surgical Neurology 72: 577-586.



Clausen, J. 2010. Ethical brain stimulation – neuroethics of deep brain stimulation in research and clinical practice. European Journal of Neuroscience 32: 1152–1162.




Gilbert, F. and Ovadia, D. 2011. Deep brain stimulation in the media: over-optimistic portrayals call for a new strategy involving journalists and scientists in ethical debate. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 10(5):16




Racine, E. et al. 2005. fMRI in the public eye. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(2): 159–164.




Racine, E. et al. 2010. Contemporary neuroscience in the media. Social Science and Medicine 71(4): 725-733.



Schlaepfer, T. E., and Fins, J. 2010. Deep brain stimulation and the neuroethics of responsible publishing, when one is not enough. JAMA 303: 775–776.




Servello D., et al. 2010. Long-term, post-deep brain stimulation management of a series of 36 patients affected with refractory gilles de la tourette syndrome. Neuromodulation 13(3): 187-194.




Tir, M. et al. 2007. Exhaustive, one-year follow-up of subthalamic nucleus deep brain stimulation in a large, single-center cohort of parkinsonian patients. Neurosurgery 61(2): 297-305.




van Lente, H. et al.2013. Comparing technological hype cycles: Towards a theory. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 80(8): 1615-1628.




Woloshin, S. et al. 2009. Press releases from academic medical centers: not so academic? Annals of Internal Medicine 150(9): 613-618.





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Ovadia, D. (2014). Media and social stigma can influence the patient adaptation to neurotechnologies and DBS. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on

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An overview of Neurointerventions and the Law: Regulating Human Capacity (Lawyers, Neuroscientists, Philosophers, and Psychologists in Conversation)

During the weekend of September 12^th,
Georgia State University was home to fascinating conversations between
prominent lawyers, neuroscientists, philosophers, and psychologists. The
challenging, thought-provoking, and interdisciplinary nature of this forum was
condensed within its title: Neurointerventions
and the Law: Regulating Human Mental Capacity.

Image from AJOB Neuroscience

Organized
by the Atlanta Neuroethics Consortium (ANEC), the conference sought debate on
the legal implications of using modern neuro-interventions. Some of the
questions that were raised included, but were not limited to:

• 
  What
  mental capacities does one need in order to be eligible for trial? For
  punishment? For release? For cognitive enhancement?
  


• 
  What
  policies should be in place to control such neuro-interventions?
  


• 
  What
  are the current neuro-interventions used in the courts, and how are they
  regulated?
  


• 
  How
  should we view the relationship between mental capacity and both moral and
  legal responsibility? 

Image
from Knowing Neurons

The
conference gathered many prominent members of the MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Law and Neuroscience. Some of the participants were Senior
Judge Andre Davis (U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit), Nita
Farahany (Duke
University), Walter
Glannon (University
of Calgary, Stephen
Morse (University
of Pennsylvania Law School), Justice
David Nahmias (Supreme
Court of Georgia), and Paul
Root Wolpe (Emory
Center for Ethics).




The
conference schedule was structured around four panels, each followed by
“parallel streams” of three 30 to 40 minute long related talks given by panelists
or conference attendees. Panels were released under the form of case studies
that raised valuable questions about the use of neuro-interventions in a legal
context. The format of the panel discussions was dynamic and interactive.
First, each panelist presented his or her own views on the topic, then the
chairs opened discussion among panelists by pointing out specific arguments,
converging or diverging positions, and follow-up questions prompted by the
panelists’ points. Finally, audiences had ample time to ask questions.

Image from The
Jury Expert

More
detailed information about each panel is available here, but following is a summary of each
panel. To better frame the general course of a panel, I will discuss the first
panel in more detail.




Panel 1: Making People Sane Enough for Release




The
case discussed was that of State
of New South Wales v Williamson.
In 1990, a then 20-year old Williamson was sentenced to 24 years of
imprisonment on account of violent sexual assault. He was released after 22
years on supervised parole on the condition of continuing treatment with the
testosterone inhibitor cyprotene in the hopes of reducing the uncontrolled
sexual urges of the offender. The ensuing questions was, “Should a
neurointervention be a condition of release from prison for sex offenders?”.




Chris Ryan, a psychiatrist at the University of
Sydney, and Katrina Sifferd, a philosopher from Elmhurst College,
chaired the first panel. The panelists included a justice on the Supreme Court
of Georgia, two neuroscientists, and two philosophers – testimony to the
interdisciplinary nature of the conference. After the case was presented, Justice Nahmias
remarked – to my surprise – that neuro-interventions such as drug
administration and counseling in Georgia courts are pervasive, and designed to
keep as offenders out of the prisons. Philosopher Farah
Focquart then pointed
out that even though testosterone inhibitors may reduce sexual thoughts, there
is no evidence that they also remove aberrant sexual behaviors in sex offenders.




The
conversation took an interesting spin when the panelists started questioning
the divide between a sexual offender and a sexual offender with a sex disorder:
how does introducing self-control in the equation change the grounds of
culpability? Can we prevent sexual offenses from happening by finding a way to
increase self-control, rather than decreasing sexual urges? Ultimately, the panel
discussion arrived to a new, yet equally pertinent larger question: Is all bad
behavior pathological? Can categories that were previously restricted to the
legal sphere undergo medicalization, and how would that affect legal
responsibility and accountability? All these are intriguing questions that
require interdisciplinary evaluation as that promoted by the Neurointerventions and the Law
conference.




Panel 2: Making People Sane Enough for Punishment




This
panel focused on the case of Scott Panetti, a man suffering from delusional
disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and alcohol and drug abuse, who was
sentenced to death after murdering two people. The question raised by this
panel was whether neuro-interventions can and should be used to restore an
inmate’s eligibility for punishment. Follow-up questions included what exactly
constitutes eligibility for execution, and whether federal resources should be
invested in rehabilitating offenders just in order to be able to subject them
to punishment.

Scott Panetti : Image from The Austin
Article

Panel
3: Making People Sane Enough for Trial




The
third panel attacked the highly controversial question of who should diagnose
whether an offender has the mental capacities to withstand trial, and whether
psychosis is always a proof of incompetency. The role and reliability of
science in the courts was evaluated, and panelists concluded that the
consideration of scientific insights within a court of law needs to satisfy
three distinct tiers of reliability: of
the method, of the method with respect to the case in question, and of the
person doing the expert testimony. Interesting corollary discussions explored
the reliability of eye-witness testimony, which has historically been shown to
be limited, particularly for cases in cross-racial cases. From a more
neuroscientific perspective, the panelists evaluated the various methods of
neuro-rehabilitation for schizophrenia such as memory enhancement drugs,
cholinesterase inhibitors, and electroshock therapy.




Two
points made during this panel particularly stood out to me. First, in providing a
legal perspective on this question, Judge Davis made the stimulating remark that the law
is not concerned with our philosophical lives. Second, in discussing the
possible application of fMRI techniques to detect brain activation typical to
lying during testimony (that is, if imaging techniques ever become advanced
enough to reach reliability standards), how could the courts account for a case
in which a particular false event memory is true for the testifier?




Panel 4: Cognitive Enhancement




The
last panel was of particular interest to me. As a current college student, I am
witnessing some of my peers’ desperate and constant search to obtain
prescription medications such as Adderall and Ritalin in order to improve their
academic performance. The use of such drugs, by virtue of providing users with
increased mental abilities, may confer them an unfair academic advantage;
therefore, institutions such as Duke University have categorized the use of
cognitive enhancement drugs as a breach
of academic honesty. The panelists discussed the necessity of policies such
as that instituted by Duke and other ethical implications of cognitive
enhancement.

Image from The
Chronicle

Parallel
Streams




There
were eight distinct sessions of parallel streams, each consisting of three
talks related in one way or another to the topic of the panel discussion. Since
the audience of these talks was generally much smaller than that of the panel
discussions, these panels were a great way to further conversations and allow
more ample time for audience questions. Sometimes, however, it was difficult to
choose one stream in lieu of another.




Poster
Session




The
conference integrated a poster session that attracted students from various
disciplines and institutions. Some of the titles were “Enhancing Brain Activity
Through Cognitive Entrainment”, “Coffee and Cognition”, and “Neuroscience and
its Mind Altering Potential for Marketing”.




Closing thoughts




I was
personally captivated by the interdisciplinary conversations I witnessed at the
conference. As a neuroscience student, I am much more familiar with the
specific tools of neuroscience and their applications than I am with Georgia’s
code of laws, for instance. In that respect, I learned quite a bit about the
legal perspective on mental illness and cognitive enhancement. Furthermore, I
have always been interested in how a fixed code of laws can address individuals
fairly, and Neuro-interventions and the
Law directed my questions towards new directions: Does justice mean judging
an individual against a fixed code applied broadly, or should it take into
consideration, for example, the effects of early childhood trauma on
neurodevelopment? Where should the line be set on this matter so that justice
is upheld?




ANEC’s
mission statement is to “bring together individuals and institutions who are
concerned with the ethical, legal, and social implications of emerging
neuroscience research and technology, and the neuroscientific foundations of
moral behavior”. The Neurointerventions
and the Law conference was a commendable effort to endorse the function of
the new group, and a standing proof to the need of engaging in
interdisciplinary conversation to advance both neuroscience research and the
effectiveness of the legal process. It is
only natural to engage multiple fields: we can only know what is just if we
form an idea of what it means to be human, and philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience all bring different information towards constructing a more
complete answer.






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Lucaciu, I. (2014). An overview of Neurointerventions and the Law: Regulating Human Capacity (Lawyers, Neuroscientists, Philosophers, and Psychologists in Conversation). The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from
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Agency Revisited: Dr. Heidi Ravven on Moral Psychology, Ethics and the Myth of Free Will

By Stephanie Hare



Stephanie Hare is a second-year PhD student studying neuroscience at Georgia State University. She is the recipient of the first 2CI Neuroethics Doctoral Fellowship and has research interests in psychiatry, law and the normative impact of neuroimaging research. You can connect with Steph via email at share1@student.gsu.edu or use her Twitter handle, @NeuroSteph.



On September 20, Emory University hosted a book talk and signing with Dr. Heidi Ravven, author of The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences and the Myth of Free Will. Dr. Ravven received an unsolicited $500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation to write a book rethinking traditional ethical frameworks and theories of moral agency. As a leading scholar on the work of Baruch Spinoza and Jewish philosophy, Ravven is perfectly situated to recognize socio-cultural assumptions regarding our beliefs about free will and agency, allowing for the consideration of alternative perspectives. For nine years, she performed research on new findings from psychology and neuroscience to gain deeper insight into the fundamental facts about human nature and flourishing, and in turn, what we can and should reasonably expect of each other as moral agents.

Via hamilton.edu

Over the course of her talk, Dr. Ravven aimed to dispel two myths.¹



1. We (moral agents) are predominately motivated to act out of self-interest, and we each make our own choices.



2. Each of us has free will.



To challenge the first claim, Ravven draws on literature from evolutionary neurobiology – especially the work of Dr. Jaak Panksepp – claiming that empirical evidence reveals that we are motivated by much more than selfish motives. Panksepp’s research and theory suggest that each of us comes equipped with a foundational motivational system, which he terms the SEEKING system.² While Panksepp claims that the SEEKING system drives us to pursue certain ends, and is evolutionarily conserved across many (mammalian) species, Ravven draws attention to the fact that this system “not only drives (humans) to protect our bodies but also permeates the mind, which is to say our desires and beliefs.”³



If we consider the SEEKING system in isolation – a system that provides the basis for self-preservation, perseverance and goal-oriented action – we can easily get caught up in the idea that we (human agents) are wholly self-interested. Ravven reasons that this perspective does not provide the whole story since “more often than not, the self we protect is the Group Self rather than the discrete self whose boundaries are our skin”⁴ and that we can think of ourselves as selfy in a groupy kind of way.⁵ Many theories of moral agency do not account for the fact that we are social beings with complex goals and aims, far exceeding the simple motive of self-interest. Ravven shows us that the assumption that individual agents act (exclusively) out of self-interest is oversimplified and inaccurate. Thus, it would suit us to find or develop theories of agency that are compatible with the complexities of goal-oriented action and group decision-making.



In the next part of her talk, Ravven set out to show that free will is a myth. She began by defining ‘free will’ as the idea or notion that “we can make choices and decisions above or beyond our biological inheritance, our cultural and social influences and location, and our present situations.”⁶



Many of us will likely find the claim that free will is false to be unsettling. Ravven reasons that this claim strikes a nerve precisely because free will has become so deeply indoctrinated in our culture that it feels natural to us.⁷ Although it feels natural to us, Ravven argues that free will is “a particularly American and Western way of conceiving of human nature"⁸ and we can trace the origins and development of this belief by looking across the history of philosophy.



As early as the 4^th century, we arguably see the first mentioning of the (free) will in the work of Saint Augustine: “I sighed after such freedom . . . but was bound by the iron of my own choice. The enemy had a grip on my will.”⁹ This Augustinian notion of the will had widespread influence on the work of modern philosophers like René Descartes. Ravven recognizes the foundation for modern notions of free will in Descartes’ theory: “Virtue, according to Descartes, consists in judging what is best and then acting with complete resolve on those judgments. Our virtue is thus our strength of will in shaping the self, the body and the world rather than being shaped by them.”¹⁰

Via usc.edu

But Ravven recognizes that this is just one way to conceptualize human action and agency.¹¹ Furthermore, she thinks that these notions of free will are attributable to a form of magical thinking:

This (way of thinking) is to attribute to the human person a supernatural character . . . [Instead,] we are within nature and not beyond it; we are within social and cultural contexts and not beyond them; and our motives are shaped by all this and our immediate situations as well. We are of the world and not beyond it . . . our inner selves and the outer environments and contexts are mutually constitutive.¹²

Here, Ravven’s central aim is to show that this widespread idea that we act above and beyond nature and nurture to exercise a free will is grossly incompatible with what we know about human nature and functioning. So what does this mean for ethics?



If Ravven’s arguments are compelling, then we have reason to call into question at least two assumptions that often serve as the cornerstones of dominant theories of moral agency: (1) We predominately act out of self-interest and make individual choices, and (2) each of us has free will. If Ravven is right, the field of ethics may be in need of a major overhaul — we will likely have to re-conceptualize these theories of moral agency in light of what we know (and what we continue to learn from the sciences) about ourselves as human beings.





Footnotes



¹ This list is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, Ravven also attempts to dispel the myth that there is an innate moral module in the brain, drawing on the work of Jesse Prinz and other researchers in the field of neuroplasticity. For her take and interpretation of Prinz’s arguments, see pp. 261-263 of her book: Ravven, H. (2013). The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences and the Myth of Free Will. New York: The New Press.

² Panksepp, J., Biven, L. (2012). The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., p.95.

³ Ravven, personal communication, 29 October 2014.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Here Ravven borrows jargon from Stephen Colbert’s notion of truthiness, to discuss aspects of human nature — namely our selfiness and groupiness.

⁶ Ravven, personal communication, 29 October 2014.

⁷ Ravven, 2013, p. 3.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Augustine. (1992). Confessions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 140.

¹⁰ Ravven, 2013, p. 180.

¹¹ Baruch Spinoza was born only 36 years after Descartes. Yet, in his great work, The Ethics, Spinoza repeatedly challenges Descartes’ notion and account of free will. Spinoza even expresses astonishment that “this illustrious person” embraced in free will, “a view which I could scarcely have believed to have been put forward by such a great man.”  In embracing free will, Spinoza continues, Descartes “adopt[ed] a theory more occult than any occult quality” of the Scholastics (Spinoza, B. (1982). The Ethics and Selected Letters. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing: Part V Preface, p.204).  Influenced by Aristotle and Jewish philosophers like Maimonides, Spinoza had a completely different vision of ethics and agency.

¹² Ravven, personal communication, 29 October 2014.

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Hare, S. (2014). Agency Revisited: Dr. Heidi Ravven on Moral Psychology, Ethics and the Myth of Free Will. The Neuroethics Blog. Retrieved on , from http://www.theneuroethicsblog.com/2014/12/agency-revisited-dr-heidi-ravven-on.html